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THREE BIG IDEAS FOR A FUTURE OF 
LESS WORK AND A THREE-
DIMENSIONAL ALTERNATIVE 
CYNTHIA ESTLUND* 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Automation is destroying jobs. About that there is no doubt. Robots and 
algorithms can perform a growing range of job tasks faster, more cheaply, and or 
just plain better than humans, and are bound to replace them in many existing 
jobs. But technology has been replacing human labor and destroying jobs 
throughout the history of capitalism. The question that engages and divides 
economists and technology experts is whether automation will also generate 
enough new wealth, new consumer demand, and new jobs to offset the inevitable 
job losses. If so—and that remains the betting line among economists—then 
automation may yield higher productivity, stronger economic growth, and 
broadly shared gains. But if this time is different—as many observers and a 
growing number of economists believe—then we might face a future of much less 
work, or at least much less work for those with merely ordinary human skills. In 
that case, absent major policy interventions of some kind, many workers will face 
wage-depressing competition both from machines and from other displaced 
workers, while economic gains from automation will be sharply skewed toward 
those at the top who make or own the technology or who have scarce skills that 
are complemented by technology.1 
While recognizing those conflicting predictions about the future, this article 
takes seriously the claim that this time may be different. The current wave of 
innovation—as suggested by the terms artificial intelligence (AI) and machine 
learning (ML)—is producing hard and soft technologies that increasingly rival or 
surpass human performance on tasks that were long thought to require uniquely 
human capabilities. In short, “the functional capabilities of machines appear to 
be rising much faster and with fewer apparent natural limits than those of 
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 1.  I review the conflicting predictions about both job destruction and job creation in an earlier 
article.  Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment Law, 128 YALE 
L.J. 254, 263–75 (2018). 
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humans,”2 while their costs are falling. That makes it plausible that automation 
in the near future will destroy more jobs than it creates and drive down wages in 
the low- and medium-skill jobs that remain. That trajectory, though far from 
certain or inevitable, is likely enough that we should be thinking hard about how 
to respond. 
In earlier work, I proposed that employment law should “first, do no harm.”3  
Some features of existing employment law tend to spur the automation of work 
(as well as the fissured organization of work) by artificially and unnecessarily 
taxing the use of human labor. In order to reduce the employment law tax on 
labor while protecting workers’ rights and working conditions, we should first 
separate the question of what workers’ entitlements should be from the question 
of where their economic burdens should fall. Some worker entitlements 
necessarily entail employer duties and burdens—that is how the law induces 
employers to change their behavior. But for other entitlements that do not have 
this feature—health insurance or paid leave mandates, for example—we should 
look for ways to shift the costs off of employer payrolls and onto a broader 
funding base, or to detach the entitlements from employment altogether. Either 
way, we should seek funding mechanisms that do not tax the employment of 
human labor and that redistribute wealth from the winners to the losers in the 
increasingly polarized economy that automation is helping to create.4 
The point of shifting the costs of some benefits and entitlements from the 
employment platform to a broader foundation would be to incrementally slow 
the replacement of people with technology, and to make a modest start on the 
larger project of reconstructing the foundations of economic security in a future 
of less work. But there remains a serious (though still uncertain and hotly 
debated) risks of job displacement, net job destruction, and severe economic 
polarization as a consequence of automation. That prospect calls for a more 
profound reckoning with the shape of our social and economic institutions. We 
should be looking over the horizon and developing policies and institutions that 
can more equitably spread the gains and mitigate the losses from the accelerating 
automation of work. 
Those questions of policy and institutional arrangements are complicated by 
some basic normative disagreements. The most basic is whether we should 
welcome or resist a future in which paid work recedes from the center of our lives. 
Some find that vision deeply unsettling given our collective and individual 
reliance on work not only for its economic returns but also as a crucial source of 
social cohesion, solidarity, and self-realization. Those observers would have us 
strive as a society to ensure that there will be decent full-time jobs for all who are 
able to work. Others would welcome a future of much less work and more time 
 
 2.  Id. at 293. 
 3.  See generally id. at 291–95. In the earlier article, I did not use that phrase, which evokes the 
Hippocratic Oath of the medical profession; but it seems apt.  
 4.  The argument is elaborated in id. at 301–19. 
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for the rest of life—provided that we can also draw on the very large gains from 
automation to ensure a decent livelihood for all.5 
For now, that normative and policy debate mainly engages those on the left 
of the political spectrum—both those who see impending job losses and their 
political fallout as the beginning of the end of capitalism, and those in the center 
left who believe that capitalism in some form is here to stay but that government 
should play a larger role in managing and mitigating its dislocations. Those on 
the right largely resist the latter notion, out of some combination of beliefs in 
small government and individual self-reliance and in the capacity of markets on 
their own to produce enough prosperity and opportunities for all those who are 
willing to work hard to seize them. Yet even those who now resist a larger 
government role in the economy—whether to create jobs or to redistribute 
income, for example—may find their beliefs unsettled if job losses do begin to 
mount, and especially if civil and political unrest or deepening social dysfunction 
follow. 
When we turn to the daunting question of how to fairly spread the gains and 
mitigate the losses from automation-related job destruction, we find some big 
ideas contending for public favor and gaining some currency within American 
political discourse: Both the idea of a universal basic income (UBI) and the idea 
of a federal job guarantee (FJG) offer bold strategies for rebalancing the 
economy in favor of those at the bottom of the labor market; and both offer 
prescriptions for a future of less (market-generated) work. Those two ideas are 
in competition with each other, and only partly because each would require a 
level of public expenditures that, practically speaking, would largely foreclose the 
other.6 In the meantime, some scholars and advocates are pressing a different big 
idea that echoes an abiding aspiration of organized labor in the first century of 
industrial capitalism: reducing hours of work below the forty-hour week that has 
held steady since the New Deal, thereby both increasing leisure and spreading 
work.7 
Each of those three big ideas has surfaced before in the United States and 
beyond, and each is touted by some as the single best response to the medium-
term prospect of technological unemployment. Yet each of those big ideas—
apart from facing serious practical and political hurdles—falls short on one of the 
three dimensions of socioeconomic well-being that we should be looking to 
achieve: decent remunerative work; a decent income or livelihood; and more time 
for pursuits other than work. 
At the same time, each of those three big ideas holds within it an essential 
component of a sound three dimensional response to the uncertain but real 
prospect of job losses. In lieu of UBI, we should expand universal social 
benefits—starting with health care and higher education—and income support 
 
 5.  Id. at 275–83. 
 6.  See infra text at notes 43–47 and 83–85. 
 7.  See generally Matthew Dimick, Better Than Basic Income? Liberty, Equality, and the Regulation 
of Working Time, 50 IND. L. REV. 473 (2017). 
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for the working and non-working poor. In lieu of a federal job guarantee, we 
should ramp up public investments in infrastructure, social and community 
services, and early education, all of which would address unmet societal needs 
while creating decent jobs. And in lieu of (or at least before) reducing weekly 
hours of work across the board, we should expand access to paid leaves, holidays, 
and vacations, as well as voluntary part-time work and retirement security; we 
could thereby spread work and meet varied individual needs and preferences 
through days, weeks, months, and years of time off. 
In combination, these three interventions—expanded universal social 
benefits and income support, public investments in physical and social 
infrastructure and the job creation those will entail, and wider access to paid 
leaves and respites from work—would advance core objectives of each of the 
three big ideas while muting their disadvantages. Together they would both 
cushion and offset automation-related job losses, while spreading the work that 
remains and maintaining or boosting incomes. This trio of policies could and 
should also be funded in a way that helps to redistribute income from the top to 
the bottom of an egregiously and increasingly lopsided income distribution. 
Moreover—and this is crucial as long as the impact of automation on jobs 
remains uncertain—these three policies together and separately would inure to 
the greater societal good even if the evangelists of creative destruction are right, 
and private sector job creation does, or could, keep pace with job destruction. 
Indeed, even some of those who preach creative destruction maintain that 
policies like these will be necessary to fuel the job creation side of the equation 
this time around.8 
Another virtue of this three-dimensional strategy over any one of the three 
big ideas writ large is that it would better promote liberty and freedom of choice 
in a world of divergent preferences. Thoughtful people disagree about whether 
to welcome or resist a future that is less centered on paid work. That 
disagreement reflects not only varying views of the good life and the good society, 
but also varying individual needs and preferences with respect to the best mix of 
work, income, and leisure, and the best balance of autonomy and security. 
Individuals face different tradeoffs, and they evaluate the tradeoffs differently. 
Public policies should aim to accommodate those varying preferences and to 
expand individuals’ freedom to make the choices that suit them and their 
families. That is not to say that there are no social spillovers from individuals’ 
choices, or that public policy should be indifferent among those choices. But 
choice and freedom are among the values we should be promoting. That should 
temper our enthusiasm for any big idea that is premised on the superiority of one 
 
 8.  Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: Workforce Transitions in a Time of Automation, MCKINSEY GLOBAL 
INST., 55–64 (2017) https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/future% 
20of%20organizations/what%20the%20future%20of%20work%20will%20mean%20for%20jobs%20s
kills%20and%20wages/mgi-jobs-lost-jobs-gained-report-december-6-2017.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/EML4-YY9J]. 
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choice over others—for example, full-time employment for all, or a shorter work 
week for all—or that would practically foreclose other solutions. 
In what follows, I will fill in the outlines of this argument. Part II will briefly 
set out some normative priors about the multiple ends we should be pursuing as 
we face a future of less work. A long Part III will take up each of the Three Big 
Ideas, briefly tracing their genealogy and identifying some strengths and 
weaknesses of each. Part IV will return to the core aspirations of the Three Big 
Ideas, and sketch a combination of the three – a three-dimensional strategy – that 
can preserve much of the good while avoiding much that is problematic in the 
more single-minded Three Big Ideas. 
II. 
THREE COMPLEMENTARY GOALS, AND THE ABIDING VALUE OF WORK IN A 
FUTURE WITH LESS OF IT 
The premise of all that follows is that a prosperous, productive, and 
technologically advanced economy should be organized and regulated so as to 
ensure wide access to three economic goods:  a decent material standard of living, 
meaningful and productive work, and time for a variety of non-work pursuits. To 
oversimplify the point, income, work, and leisure are three dimensions of a good 
livelihood, and policy proposals for a future of less work should be judged against 
their ability to deliver on all three of those dimensions. 
The intrinsic value of income, or a decent material standard of living, and of 
leisure, or time for life outside of paid work, is fairly self-evident (though I will 
have more to say about both in Parts II and III). To be sure, above some 
minimum level of both income and leisure, people vary—both among themselves 
and across their lifespans—in their preferred balance of those two dimensions. 
But I think it is fair to assume that both income and leisure are intrinsically and 
universally valuable: everyone needs and wants a modicum of each. (Even 
workaholics need to sleep.) That is not to say that everyone agrees that the 
government should ensure that modicum of income and leisure for all; but among 
those who do believe that public policy should aim to improve people’s lives, 
there should be little controversy that basic material security and adequate time 
for oneself and one’s family outside of work are two goals against which to assess 
public policy proposals. 
The more contestable claim is that work itself—specifically, productive and 
remunerative work—is among the three dimensions of a good life and livelihood, 
wide access to which a society should aim to ensure. In traditional economic 
analysis, work is regarded as a disutility—a means of gaining income but not a 
good in itself.9 And surely many workers with boring, arduous, dangerous, or 
demeaning jobs would agree. 
 
 9.  See Robert E. Lane, Work as “disutility” and money as “happiness”: Cultural origins of a basic 
market error, 21 J. SOCIO-ECON. 43, 48–51 (1992). 
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Therein lies a serious objection to putting work on the same plane with 
income and leisure: The latter two are intrinsically valuable in part because they 
can be spent in varied ways as individuals choose. They are resources that have 
an almost endless variety of uses, and that obviously enhance individuals’ real 
freedom to live as they wish. Different people have different quantities of income 
and leisure, of course; and people with more income can enjoy their leisure in 
ways that poorer people cannot. Still, everybody needs and wants a decent 
minimum level of each, however they might choose to spend their allotment. 
Paid work is obviously different. A life without paid work is not only possible 
but also potentially satisfying (though only for those with some other source of 
income or material support). Moreover, work comes in the shape of distinct and 
infinitely varied jobs, some which are more intrinsically rewarding than others. 
Work is not a resource that can be spent as one wishes, and most jobs entail far 
more subordination than freedom. Work is not a necessity for human thriving in 
the same sense as are material security and time away from work. Still, I want to 
make the case that paid work for those who can work is one of the dimensions 
against which we should judge public policy proposals for a future of less work. 
Obviously, one can have too much of a good thing, including work; and nothing 
in the case for work here requires adhering to our current norm of full-time work. 
We will turn to the case for less work below. My claim is that work should remain 
a central organizing feature of people’s economic and social lives, and that should 
be one goal of public policy even in a future in which there is less work to go 
around. 
The case for work combines several strands—moral, psychological, 
sociological, and political—that are not easy to disentangle. Some of those 
strands can fairly be described, and perhaps debunked, as religious or ideological 
in nature. The idea of work as a moral imperative (for those who are able) does 
indeed run deep in Western religious, and especially Protestant, thought, though 
its religious foundations would bear little weight for many citizens today. As 
capitalism eventually displaced independent artisanal production, and work 
became virtually synonymous with selling one’s labor in exchange for a wage, the 
supposed moral imperative to work took on an ideological hue. 
For some critics of capitalism, the social imperative to work is an ideological 
construct that legitimizes the commodification of labor and stands in the way of 
a more humanistic and humane future.10 On this view, a society that produces 
enough wealth to enable its citizens to devote their lives to play, making music 
and art and literature for pleasure, and enjoying family, friends, and 
communities—to leisure in whatever form each chooses—should set its sights on 
making that possible. Something like this utopian post-capitalist vision underlies 
enthusiasm for a UBI among some on the left, and we will return to it.11 That 
 
 10.  See, e.g., KATHI WEEKS, THE PROBLEM WITH WORK: FEMINISM, MARXISM, ANTIWORK 
POLITICS, AND POSTWORK IMAGINARIES (2011); NICK SRNICEK & ALEX WILLIAMS, INVENTING THE 
FUTURE: POSTCAPITALISM AND A WORLD WITHOUT WORK (2015). 
 11.  See, e.g., PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS & YANNICK VANDERBORGHT, BASIC INCOME: A RADICAL 
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vision might serve as a kind of thought experiment that challenges the pro-work 
camp to shed some deeply rooted but normatively dubious grounds for the 
attachment to work. If work is a virtue—even if it ceases to be an economic 
necessity—then its virtues should be rationally defensible without recourse to 
religion or ideology. 
The value of work is often said to lie partly in its psychic returns to 
individuals—in feelings of self-worth, self-realization, and social standing that are 
associated with work.12 The psychic returns to work tend to be greatest for those 
who have meaningful and high-status jobs, many of which are also quite well-
paid. But there is ample evidence of psychic returns even to relatively low-paid 
and low-status work and of psychic harms beyond the loss of income from being 
out of work.13 In short, many people would be better off with a job than an 
unconditional grant of money, even at the same income level, because of the 
psychic returns to the former. 
To be sure, those psychic rewards might merely reflect the pervasive societal 
drumbeat in favor of work, which might reflect those same questionable 
moralistic and ideological underpinnings rather than any intrinsic value of work. 
That is possible, and in any case is almost impossible to refute. But even if 
individuals have been socialized to experience psychic rewards from paid work, 
and could eventually be socialized out of that attachment, that begs the question 
whether a society should undertake such a reprogramming project. There might 
be sound reasons for a society to cultivate an association between paid work and 
self-worth, self-realization, and social status—and to do so even if it became 
possible to release individuals from the sheer economic necessity to work. I 
believe that is the case, for reasons that require some elaboration. 
First, even those who reject the valorization of paid work would probably 
agree that a good and sustainable society is one in which most people are engaged 
in some kind of regular, purposeful, and cooperative associations and activities. 
A functioning, self-governing society requires a thick substrate of social ties 
among citizens—not just ephemeral ties among those who happen to live in 
proximity, and not just intimate ties among close family and friends, but the 
looser connections and connectedness that come from cooperating toward shared 
ends. Paid work has long been the primary locus of purposeful cooperative 
 
PROPOSAL FOR A FREE SOCIETY AND A SANE ECONOMY, 100–32 (2017); SRNICEK & WILLIAMS, supra 
note 10; WEEKS, supra note 10, at 155–71. 
 12.  See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); see Matthew Modini et al., The Mental Health Benefits of Employment: 
Results of a Systemic Meta-Review, 24 AUSTRALASIAN PSYCHIATRY 331 (2016); Anthony Winefield & 
Marika Tiggermann, Employment Status and Psychological Well-Being: A Longitudinal Study, 75 J. APP. 
PSYCHOL. 455 (1990). 
 13.  See Jennie E. Brand, The Far-Reaching Impact of Job Loss and Unemployment, 41 ANN. REV. 
OF SOC. 359 (2015); Frances McKee-Ryan et al., Psychological and Physical Well-Being During 
Unemployment: A Meta-Analytic Study, 90 APP. PSYCHOL. 53 (2005). For a vehement dissenting view, 
see David Graeber, On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs: A Work Rant, STRIKE! MAGAZINE (2013), 
https://strikemag.org/bullshit-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/CZX6-MGD4]. 
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activity in our society, and generates social ties that are part of the glue that holds 
a complex society together.14 
Of course, work is not the only locus of purposeful cooperation. Voluntary 
associations formed around charitable, political, religious, cultural, or 
recreational aims can also foster cooperation, sociability, solidarity, and 
connectedness; and those associations are less tainted by the economic 
compulsion and hierarchical control that is characteristic of workplace 
organizations. Many political theorists thus locate voluntary associations at the 
core of civil society, and discount the value of workplace ties in supporting 
collective self-governance.15 Professor Robert Putnam has famously argued that 
it is chiefly through voluntary associations that citizens develop social capital, or 
the relationships and norms of reciprocity that enable people to cooperate in 
pursuit of shared objectives, including shared governance.16 As citizens devote 
less time and energy to voluntary associations, he says, the store of social capital 
in American society is eroding.17 On that view, it would be a worthy goal to enable 
people to opt out of paid work so that they can spend more time in voluntary, 
non-remunerative activities and associations. But those arguments overlook the 
distinctive social value in the ties formed through shared work.18 
The distinctive importance of workplace ties stems partly from their sheer 
density and duration. Working adults spend much of their waking life interacting 
with co-workers—in the course of the job, before and after work, during breaks, 
around the proverbial water cooler. They talk about shared working conditions—
a speed-up of production, a rumor of layoffs, a new supervisor—and about 
family, politics, popular culture, sports, and other stuff of daily life. Over weeks, 
months, or even years of working together, co-workers develop ties of affection, 
empathy, loyalty, solidarity, and friendship. To be sure, some of those ties may 
be fraught and tainted by conflict and resentment (not to mention abuse or 
humiliation from above). But given all that is at stake in a job, people often find 
ways to work through or around conflicts and to get along, or at least get the job 
done, despite personal differences. Outside the bonds of family and close 
friendship, bonds among co-workers have a resilience that is unlikely to be 
replicated through voluntary associations. 
 
 14.  See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS 
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003). 
 15.  See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 366–67 (1996); JEAN L. COHEN 
& ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY ix (1992); JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL 
SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA 235 (1999). 
 16.  PUTNAM, supra note 12. That does not mean that all forms of “social capital” are to the greater 
good of either society or individuals. See E. Villalonga-Olives & I. Kawachi, The dark side of social 
capital: A systematic review of the negative health effects of social capital, 194 SOC. SCI. & MED. 105 (2017); 
Alejandro Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 
1 (1998). 
 17.  PUTNAM, supra note 12. Indeed, as an empirical matter, Putnam finds that the decline in 
voluntary associations stems partly from the rise in time spent in paid work—especially by women; stay-
at-home mothers were a mainstay of community and neighborhood associations in the post-WWII era. 
 18.  For further elaboration, see generally, ESTLUND, supra note 14. 
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For all these reasons, common work, and the bonds that form among co-
workers and within trades or occupations, have long provided a rich medium for 
solidarity and collective self-help and a platform for organizing among ordinary 
people. That is partly because common work has often been a source of shared 
grievances—hardly an unambiguous argument for holding onto the centrality of 
work. But common work has also been a source of shared pride and identity, 
mutual sacrifice, fellowship, and a foundation for collective action. 
The resilience and robustness of workplace ties is especially important 
because co-workers are comparatively likely to come from different cultural, 
religious, racial, and ethnic backgrounds; they are more heterogeneous than the 
people one meets within families, neighborhoods, religious congregations, or 
clubs and voluntary associations.19 The workplace is the most prolific site of 
sustained interaction, and the most frequent source of friendships, among adults 
of different racial and ethnic identities.20 Daily cooperation, informal sociability, 
and shared interests and concerns among comparatively diverse co-workers 
generate interpersonal connections that tend to render the unfamiliar more 
familiar and to break down stereotypes and biases.21 
Clearly, out-group biases and in-group affinities persist at work as elsewhere; 
and their burdens fall most heavily on groups that are still underrepresented in 
good jobs, and especially in management.22 Still, it is widely accepted—and 
studies continue to show—that sustained cooperative interaction across group 
lines tends to produce more positive and egalitarian intergroup relations and 
attitudes.23 In the real world it is in the workplace, and often only there, where 
citizens of different racial and ethnic groups must find ways of getting along over 
sustained periods. 
The daily experience of working together, multiplied across legions of adult 
citizens, strengthens the social foundations for collective self-governance in a 
complex and heterogeneous society. Personal connections that span different 
backgrounds and communities provide a medium for the exchange of experiences 
and opinions, for the discovery of commonalities and differences, and for the 
cultivation of diffuse qualities of empathy and broad-mindedness that shape 
political preferences, enable compromise, and enrich public discourse. 
Paradoxically, the integrative potential of workplace ties stems partly from 
the very features that, for some theorists, disqualify them from the exalted realm 
 
 19.  See id. at 7–10, 61–69. See also Donald Tomaskovic-Deney et al., Documenting Desegregation: 
Segregation in American Workplaces by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, 1966-2003, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 565 
(2006). 
 20.  See ESTLUND, supra note 14, at 9–10, 60–69. 
 21.  A recent empirical study confirms that White individuals who work with at least one Black co-
worker manifest significantly less racial bias, and it finds strong indicator that the former is a cause and 
not merely a correlate of the latter.  See Sean Darling-Hammond, Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton & Randy 
Lee, Interracial Contact at Work: Can Workplace Diversity Reduce Bias? (April 27, 2019), available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379069 [https://perma.cc/L2ZY-XZHZ]. 
 22.  See ESTLUND, supra note 14, at 77–83. 
 23. Id. at 74–76.  
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of civil society: the presence of instrumental motives and economic power and 
hierarchy, and of state regulatory power.24 The crucial convergence of diversity 
and intense cooperation among co-workers is possible partly because of the 
economic hold that the workplace has on individuals and because of the hold that 
the law has on the workplace. The economic compulsion to sell one’s labor and 
the managerial compulsion to cooperate in production are at the heart of 
enduring critiques of capitalism. But those elements of compulsion also give 
workers a powerful motivation to find ways to deal with conflict and friction 
rather than simply walking away. The civil rights laws, for their part, help to make 
workplaces more integrated than religious or other voluntary associations, most 
of which are not subject to antidiscrimination laws, and more integrated than 
most neighborhoods and schools, which are subject to antidiscrimination laws but 
are much harder to regulate for complex reasons.25 To be clear, the law has clearly 
not eliminated discrimination, stratification, and intergroup conflict at work. In 
particular, many good jobs and workplaces are far from diverse. But a crucial 
question is: compared to what? 
Work is neither as unambiguously necessary nor as universally valued by 
individuals as is some modicum of both income and leisure. And yet there is social 
and individual value in work and working relationships that cannot be wholly 
replaced by either income or leisure, nor wholly replicated in other forms of 
associational life. The question is whether and how the economy of the future 
will perform along these three dimensions if “this time is different,” and job 
destruction increasingly outstrips job creation in a more automated economy. 
III. 
THREE BIG IDEAS (AND SOME BIG CONCERNS) 
The catchphrase “this time is different” signifies that this is not the first time 
there has been widespread discussion, along with both fears and fantasies, about 
machines largely replacing human labor. Historically, the prevailing response to 
the prospect of technological unemployment in the United States was one of 
work spreading through shorter hours. That idea seems destined to return if we 
begin to see significant net job losses, and I will turn to it below. Thus far, 
however, that idea has been overshadowed by the splashier ideas of a UBI and a 
federal jobs guarantee (FJG), which have burst onto the American political 
stage—albeit mainly “stage left”—in recent years. Surging interest in those ideas 
stems partly from growing anxiety about automation-related job losses, uncertain 
though that prospect is, and partly from less debatable developments: growing 
economic inequality and declining economic security for most workers. 
Indeed, it seems likely that, whenever and for whatever reason we face a 
shrinking pool of jobs relative to the supply of workers, variations on those three 
ideas are likely to surface: spreading or sharing jobs through reduced hours per 
 
 24.  Id. at 23–34.  
 25.  Id. at 64–69. 
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worker; creating jobs, mainly through public investments; and replacing jobs or 
cushioning their loss with income. In the current context of anxiety about 
automation, then, there is something inevitable about a three-way tug-of-war 
between job sharing, job creation, and job replacement. 
Versions of those three strategies are not incompatible. But each of the three 
strategies has a strong form—a full, subsistence-level UBI, a federal job 
guarantee, and an across-the-board reduction of the work week—that some 
adherents hold up as the best strategy for responding to declining demand for 
human labor (among other social problems). There is a distinct tendency to line 
up behind one of these ideas, sometimes explicitly in contrast to one or both of 
the others. We will see that versions of the latter two—the goal of “full-time, full 
employment” and the thirty-hour work week—battled it out during the Great 
Depression, based on contrasting visions of the good society, the good life, and 
the future of capitalism. And the first two—the UBI and the FJG—are in sharp 
tension on both normative and practical grounds. The point here is that each of 
the Three Big Ideas in its strong form has both real virtues and real flaws, 
including a tendency to foreclose one or more of the other ideas. 
I cannot pretend here to assess these proposals in anything like a 
comprehensive way. Subtleties and variations will be lost in the broad and 
selective strokes of this account. But I try to focus here on essential features of 
each of the Big Ideas and on what is right and what is problematic about each, 
especially in relation to the others. 
A. Universal Basic Income and the Perils of Decentering Work 
The idea of a basic guaranteed income for all has a very long history that runs 
through utopian thought as well as radical and progressive political programs.26 
The basic income idea draws from the same well as proposals for a negative 
income tax (once embraced by Richard Nixon), an idea to which we will return. 
But the idea has drawn wider interest in recent years, in part because of rising 
automation anxiety. Heads turned in the labor community in 2016 when Andy 
Stern, former head of the Service Employees International Union, emerged from 
a deep dive into the future of work as a strong proponent of a UBI. 27 He came to 
that view in part through discussions with experts and entrepreneurs in Silicon 
Valley who are immersed in creating automation technologies, and who are 
convinced that, in the foreseeable future, a shrinking share of the population will 
be able to find decent and steady paid work. If that is so, then universal basic 
income, however utopian its ring, may soon become a social and political 
imperative. 
There is much to be said for the UBI, and much of it has been said brilliantly 
and recently by its leading contemporary expositor, Philip Van Parijs.28 Although 
 
 26.  See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 11, at 51–98. 
 27.  See ANDY STERN WITH LEE KRAVITZ, RAISING THE FLOOR: HOW A UNIVERSAL BASIC 
INCOME CAN RENEW OUR ECONOMY AND REBUILD THE AMERICAN DREAM (2016). 
 28.  VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 11. 
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I raise concerns here about the UBI, what follows here owes much to Van Parijs 
and his co-author’s detailed defense of the UBI, its history, its normative 
underpinnings and likely consequences, and its economic and political feasibility, 
all in comparison to its leading rivals in the policy domain. 
To begin with, the UBI in its ideal form has many compelling virtues: It would 
effectively abolish poverty and its debilitating physical, psychic, and cognitive 
burdens on adults and especially children.29 For those who lack other savings or 
family resources, a UBI would provide a reliable safety net, a meaningful exit 
option from a bad job, time to search and hold out for a better job, a firmer floor 
from which to launch a new venture or develop new skills, and support for the 
choice to work shorter hours or to take time off work for parenting or 
volunteering or other valuable but unremunerative activities. Unlike most 
existing means-tested benefit programs, a UBI would not actively discourage 
work or marriage because benefits would not be reduced to reflect earned income 
or spousal income.30 Moreover, by underwriting workers’ ability to quit a job 
without falling into poverty, a UBI would do much to curb employer abuse and 
improve labor practices at the low end of the labor market.31 At the same time, a 
UBI that was adequate to live on (a qualification explored further below) would 
presumably eliminate the need for a legally-mandated minimum wage or a “living 
wage.”32 Employers might create some lower wage jobs that are not otherwise 
worth filling, and some individuals might accept them; but it would not be out of 
the bare economic compulsion to work and would be hard to label as exploitative. 
It is revealing that support for a UBI runs from the far left—where it is seen 
as ushering in a post-capitalist future by freeing individuals from the need to sell 
their labor33—to the libertarian right, where it is seen as an antidote to the bloated 
welfare state bureaucracy.34 Not surprisingly, the UBI concept also meets harsh 
 
 29.  For an overview of recent academic research on the psychological effects of poverty, see BEN 
FELL & MILES HEWSTONE, JOSEPH ROWNTREE FOUND, PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
POVERTY (2015). 
 30.  VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 11, at 41, 159–160.  For a thorough theoretical and 
empirical overview of the work incentive controversy, see generally Ed Dolan, A Universal Basic Income 
and Work Incentives. Part 1: Theory, ECONOMONITOR (Aug. 18, 2014), https://moneymaven.io/ 
economonitor/emerging-markets/a-universal-basic-income-and-work-incentives-part-1-theory-
W3yJ6kRFek6eugtwwZMZxQ/ [https://perma.cc/Q7WF-FFZN]; Ed Dolan, A Universal Basic Income 
and Work Incentives. Part 2: Evidence, ECONOMONITOR (Aug. 25, 2014), http://archive. 
economonitor.com/dolanecon/2014/08/25/a-universal-basic-income-and-work-incentives-part-2-
evidence/ [https://perma.cc/MP5L-AEKR]. 
 31.  See ROBERT S. TAYLOR, EXIT LEFT: MARKETS AND MOBILITY IN REPUBLICAN THOUGHT, 
12–25 (2017). 
 32.  See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 11, at 30–50. 
 33.  See id. at 4–28. 
 34.  See id. at 84–87 (discussing Chicago titans Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek’s support for 
basic income schemes); see also Matt Zwolinski, Property Rights, Coercion, and the Welfare State: The 
Libertarian Case for a Basic Income for All, 19 THE INDEPENDENT REV. 515 (2015); e.g., David Frum, 
A Rule for Conservative Anti–Poverty Plans: Keep It Simple, THE ATLANTIC (July 31, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/the-key-for-conservative-anti-poverty-plans-keep-
it-simple/375392/ [https://perma.cc/5PLR-LNMP]; Matt Zwolinski, The Pragmatic Libertarian Case for a 
Basic Income Guarantee, CATO UNBOUND (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.cato-unbound.org/ 
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criticism across the entire political spectrum.35 On the left, some see the UBI as 
propping up rather than undermining late capitalism, 36 or as sapping solidarity at 
its source in shared work,37 or as a Trojan horse that would lead to dismantling 
social welfare programs and leaving the poor worse off. 38 On the right, many 
strongly resist the idea of giving “handouts” to able-bodied people, as well as the 
forced redistribution of income it would entail.39 Across the whole political 
spectrum, the idea of sending cash to Jeff Bezos (and millions of others who 
simply don’t need it) provokes puzzlement or ridicule.40 
The extraordinary political diversity among both proponents and critics of the 
UBI is partly a reflection of the diversity of proposals that travel under the UBI 
rubric. I aim here not to survey all those proposals, or all of the arguments for 
and against the UBI, but to focus in on a particular set of objections 
foreshadowed in Part I. To that end, I will flag a few basic design issues. 
Two major points of divergence among UBI proposals are intertwined, and 
together they largely determine the cost of a UBI: how large would the basic 
grants be, and would they replace or supplement existing social programs? The 
questions are intertwined because a uniform and universal cash grant that is large 
enough to replace all existing means-tested programs for the poor (without 
reducing anyone’s benefits) would be fantastically costly.41 Many critics from the 
left thus fear that a smaller UBI-only scheme would be or become a vehicle for 
decimating social welfare benefits, leaving many people worse off.42 On the other 
hand, a UBI that was layered atop all of those existing programs could be smaller, 
 
2014/08/04/matt-zwolinski/pragmatic-libertarian-case-basic-income-guarantee [https://perma.cc/8H9W-
DLRQ]. 
 35.  For a thoughtful analysis of the varied political views on UBI, see Peter Frase, On the Politics of 
Basic Income, PETER FRASE, July 16, 2018, available at http://www.peterfrase.com/2018/07/on-the-
politics-of-basic-income/ [https://perma.cc/6CCA-UGCB]. 
 36.  See Alyssa Battistoni, The False Promise of Universal Basic Income, DISSENT (2017), 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/false-promise-universal-basic-income-andy-stern-ruger-
bregman [https://perma.cc/6AE6-FCKG]; Daniel Zamora, The Case Against a Basic Income, JACOBIN 
(Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/12/universal-basic-income-inequality-work 
[https://perma.cc/T7DT-SRQJ]. 
 37.  See Alex Gourevitch, The Limits of a Basic Income: Means and Ends of Workplace Democracy, 
11 BASIC INCOME STUD. 17 (2017). 
 38.  See Battistoni, supra note 36. 
 39.  George Zarkadakis, The Case Against Universal Basic Income, HUFFPOST (Feb. 27, 2017, 6:34 
AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-case-against-universal-basic-income_us_58b0178-
ee4b02f3f81e44612 [https://perma.cc/CWV3-ZQLT]; Editorial, Chicago’s Next Really Bad Idea: A 
Guaranteed Basic Income, INV. BUS. DAILY (July 20, 2018), https://www.investors.com/ 
politics/editorials/guaranteed-basic-income/ [https://perma.cc/ZFK4-TDDU]. 
 40.  Of course, a more steeply progressive income tax would more than tax away the UBI for those 
at higher incomes and would help fund the UBI for those who do need it.  
 41.  See Zamora, supra note 36, for a canvas of the potential costs of different iterations of UBI in 
different countries. A British plan with a monthly basic income of £284 would cost 6.5% of that country’s 
annual GDP. A French plan with a monthly basic income of €1,100 would cost 35% of that country’s 
annual GDP. And Van Parijs’ plan for Belgium, with a monthly basic income of €600, would cost 6% of 
that country’s annual GDP. Note, though, that any UBI program could be partially paid for by replacing 
other social services and welfare benefits. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT supra note 11.  
 42.  See Zamora, supra note 36. 
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but would sacrifice both a major source of funding—the savings from replacing 
existing programs—and a major selling point: the simplicity, low administrative 
costs, and less intrusive nature of a UBI-only system. In between a UBI-only and 
a UBI-plus lie several alternatives, such as replacing some but not all existing 
benefits or counting the UBI as part of the means for existing means-tested 
programs so that many fewer people would qualify for the latter but nobody 
would end up worse off.43 
These basic design issues are tied up with the question of how to finance a 
UBI (beyond whatever savings are realized from replacing existing entitlements). 
Among the proposals are a higher and more steeply redistributive income tax, 
higher taxes on capital (including the hotly debated concept of a “robot tax”), a 
wealth tax, or a financial transactions tax (FTT).44 All have strengths and 
weaknesses.45 Some combination of revenue sources would likely be needed. 
These crucial design and funding issues are well rehearsed by Van Parijs and 
others.46 For present purposes, let us hypothesize a full, subsistence-level UBI—
one that is large enough for an individual to live on. That is currently just over 
$1000 per month,47 which is about the level suggested by many UBI proponents.48 
That is what would be required to secure the benefits cited by many UBI 
proponents—to allow individuals who lack other resources to reject or quit 
degrading or oppressive jobs, or to take time off of work for training and 
education. And that is what would be required for a UBI by itself to stave off 
mass immiseration in the event of large-scale job destruction due to automation. 
Let us further posit that this amount would be counted as part of an individuals’ 
means for purposes of any existing means-tested programs. That would 
drastically shrink the size and overall cost of those programs, and perhaps wholly 
 
 43.  See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 11. 
 44.  I briefly review potential sources of revenue for large redistributive programs in Estlund, What 
Should We Do?, supra note 1, at 315–19. 
 45.  The FTT, for example, has a surface appeal that is undercut by the fact that taxing the often-tiny 
percentage gains from financial transactions would inevitability discourage those transactions and reduce 
tax revenue. (For a harsh critique of the FTT, sometimes called a Tobin tax or a Robin Hood tax, see 
Tim Worstall, The Monstrous Idiocy of the Robin Hood Tax Rears Its Ugly Head Again, FORBES (Mar. 
20, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/03/20/the-monstrous-idiocy-of-the-robin-hood-
tax-rears-its-ugly-head-again/#2902584576aa [https://perma.cc/D9T5-CKFQ]. To be sure, it might 
independently make sense to discourage those transactions, but it is misleading to calculate expected 
revenues from the existing volume of financial transactions. See, Zamora, supra note 36. 
 46.  See, e.g., VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 11, at 133–69; Benjamin M. Friedman, 
Born to Be Free, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Oct. 12 2017, at 39, 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/10/12/basic-income-born-to-be-free/ [https://perma.cc/FV3Z-
MJGC]; Jordi Alcarons et al., Feasibility of Financing a Basic Income, 9 BASIC INCOME STUD. 79 (2014); 
FELIX FITZROY & JIM JIN, IZA INST. OF LABOR ECON., BASIC INCOME AND A PUBLIC JOB OFFER: 
COMPLEMENTARY POLICIES TO REDUCE POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT 6–11 (2017). 
 47.  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS Poverty Guidelines for 2019 (Jan. 11, 2019), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines [perma.cc/JLK9-L5DY]. This ignores wide variations in the cost 
of living.  
 48.  See, e.g., MICHALIS NIKIFOROS ET AL., THE ROOSEVELT INST., MODELING THE 
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME 9 (Aug. 2017). The UBI might include a 
lesser monthly grant for children. VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 11, at 9. 
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replace some of them; and it would provide an initial source of funds for the UBI. 
Even so, the additional cost of a full UBI would run into the trillions of dollars.49 
Whether or how it might be possible to fund a UBI at that level is not a 
question I will delve into here.50 It is noteworthy, however, that even Van Parijs 
and Vanderborght conclude that a full-scale UBI is too costly to be feasible in 
the United States or other developed countries in the near or medium term.51 
They propose instead a more modest partial UBI—one that falls far short of 
poverty-level subsistence, but that they hope will pave the way eventually for a 
full UBI.52 Unfortunately, that presents a dilemma. As one UBI critic argues, “to 
deliver the benefits its supporters hold out for it, the income must be substantial” 
and probably “too great for a society like ours to afford”; on the other hand, a 
smaller partial UBI “would deliver few of the promised benefits yet still cost 
enough to present a serious hurdle.”53 
If the full UBI is the right long-term aspiration, it could still make sense to 
start down that road with a partial UBI. After all, given the outrageous fortunes 
that are already flowing to those who create or own the automating technology, 
there should be some combination of taxes on income, capital, wealth, 
consumption, and other sources that could eventually finance a full UBI.54 But it 
is clear that a full UBI would absorb a sizable share of national wealth.55 
A full UBI would also foreclose other policy options. In particular, UBI 
should be evaluated as a rival, not a complement, to a large-scale jobs program 
such as the federal job guarantee.56 First, the direct revenues and budgetary 
 
 49.  See Friedman, supra note 46; Zamora, supra note 36; Robert Greenstein, Commentary: 
Universal Basic Income May Sound Attractive but, if It Occurred, Would Likelier Increase Poverty than 
Reduce It, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES: POL’Y FUTURES (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.cbpp.org/poverty-and-opportunity/commentary-universal-basic-income-may-sound-
attractive-but-if-it-occurred [https://perma.cc/A7MD-58KQ]; see also Jessica Wiederspan et al., 
Expanding the Discourse on Antipoverty Policy: Reconsidering a Negative Income Tax, 19 J. OF POVERTY 
218, 227–30 (2015) (discussing the potential costs of a negative income tax version of UBI in the US). 
 50. VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 11, at 130–170; See also Dylan Matthews, The 2 
Most Popular Critiques of Basic Income are Both Wrong, VOX, July 20, 2017, https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2017/7/20/15821560/basic-income-critiques-cost-work-negative-income-tax 
[https://perma.cc/S22W-CD7H]; Greenstein, supra note 49; Wiederspan et al,, supra note 49. 
 51.  See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 11, at 138–47. 
 52.  Id.  See also Guy Standing, Basic Income as Common Dividends: Piloting a Transformative 
Policy: A Report for the Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, PROGRESSIVE ECONOMY FORUM (May 
7, 2019), https://www.progressiveeconomyforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ PEF_Piloting_Basic_ 
Income_Guy_Standing.pdf [https://perma.cc/3K44-GZVF]. 
 53.  See Friedman, supra note 46, at 41. 
 54.  See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 11, at 147–58. 
 55.  Skeptics argue that a UBI would also cause massive inflation, eating up most of the added 
purchasing power it is designed to supply; but UBI proponents demur. See, e.g., Dylan Matthews, A new 
study debunks one of the biggest arguments against basic income, Vox, Sept. 20, 2017 
(https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/20/16256240/mexico-cash-transfer-inflation-basic-
income [https://perma.cc/N3CC-J9CX]); Scott Santens, Wouldn’t Unconditional Basic Income Just Cause 
Massive Inflation?, Basic Income, https://medium.com/basic-income/wouldnt-unconditional-basic-
income-just-cause-massive-inflation-fe71d69f15e7 [https://perma.cc/Z5WP-ETUY]. 
 56.  See Zamora, supra note 36.  
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outlays required for either a UBI or a FJG (explored more fully below) would 
almost certainly foreclose the other. Second, on the political plane, I think there 
would be insurmountable (and understandable) resistance to the idea of granting 
an unconditional basic income to individuals who had the option of a guaranteed 
job at a living wage but failed to take it up. Third, the two ideas sharply diverge 
as a normative matter, specifically in their conceptions of how people should be 
expected to earn a living. 
That brings us to a more basic critique of a full subsistence-level UBI: By 
design, it would replace paid work, including for some who are fully able to work. 
The point is often overstated, and should be qualified. First, most people with 
marketable skills will still seek paid work to supplement a subsistence-level 
income. Second, a UBI would enable some people to develop those skills, to wait 
for a work opportunity that better fits their skills and interests, or to launch or 
join in a new independent enterprise. Third, unlike many existing means-tested 
programs, at least a UBI would not actively discourage poor beneficiaries from 
working, for benefits would not drop off as earned income rose.57 All in all, the 
effect of a UBI on beneficiaries’ activities is a contingent empirical question, and 
one that is exceptionally difficult to study, for it depends on many design issues 
as well as the availability of paid work in a more automated future.58 Not 
surprisingly, none of the existing studies of how a UBI might affect beneficiaries’ 
activities replicates the conditions of a subsistence-level UBI in a wealthy post-
industrial society.59 
On the face of it, there is no getting away from the fact that a subsistence-
level UBI would subsidize individuals’ choice to forego work. The work-
replacing nature of the UBI is a feature that leading proponents defend, even as 
they argue that it is overstated.60 To be sure, a UBI avoids the pitfalls of most 
existing means-tested programs, which actively discourage work at some income 
levels.61 On the other hand, the UBI would deliver a check to some people who 
would not qualify for benefits, and would otherwise seek work. Perhaps the 
bigger problem is that a UBI is incompatible—fiscally, politically, and 
normatively—with proposals for large-scale public job creation.62 At least in that 
sense, the UBI effectively gives up on the social norm of paid work as the 
presumptive and primary basis for individuals’ economic security, and on a 
societal commitment to sustain that norm. Unless and until that surrender 
becomes inescapable, we should avoid it. 
 
 57.  For a thorough theoretical and empirical overview of the work incentive controversy, especially 
as compared to means-tested benefits, see generally Dolan, supra note 30.   
 58.  See Dolan, Part 2, supra note 30; KARL WILDERQUIST, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BASIC 
INCOME EXPERIMENTS FOR RESEARCHERS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CITIZENS 43–70 (2018).   
 59.  See id. at 43–70.  Guy Standing proposes a pilot program to address that empirical gap.  See 
Standing, supra note 52. 
 60.  See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 11, at 100–32; Philippe Van Parijs, Why Surfers 
Should Be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income, 20 Phil. & Publ. Affairs 101 (1991). 
 61.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  
 62.  See supra notes 44–52 and accompanying text. 
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I have already shown my hand in Part I: I believe that individuals, 
communities, and the society will be stronger and healthier if work (albeit 
perhaps less of it) is presumptively central to most people’s economic livelihoods. 
Both by inducing some individuals to drop out of the workforce and by soaking 
up social resources that might otherwise go into job creation, a UBI is likely to 
contribute to long term disengagement from the paid workforce, and the 
attendant social alienation and anomie that would entail, for some significant 
share of the beneficiaries.63 But there is a bit more to say about the pro-work 
objection to the UBI. 
One pro-work argument against the UBI—and one with particular political 
resonance in the United States—invokes fairness concerns. As Jon Elster put it, 
it is “unfair for able-bodied people to live off the labour of others.”64 Van Parijs 
calls this the “Malibu Surfer” problem, and he has put forward a solution within 
liberal theory.65 To brutally condense his sophisticated argument: In modern 
economies, labor markets do not clear—that is, some people who are willing and 
able to work remain unemployed because wages do not fall to the level at which 
some employer is willing to hire them. Under those conditions, those who are 
employed realize greater income and other rewards to work than they would in 
a market-clearing economy. Where all that is true, Van Parijs argues, it is fair to 
tax part of that surplus to fund a basic income for those who are left without a 
job.66 The argument has greater traction in “affluent societies with high rates of 
unemployment”67—that is, not today’s society but one that automation might 
bring about in the foreseeable future. 
Van Parijs’s argument, however persuasive in principle, is unlikely to defuse 
the political objections to taxing those who work to subsidize “slackers.” That is 
just part of what is likely to doom the UBI as a political matter, at least in the US, 
and at least until and unless we are clearly facing an automation apocalypse. But 
here I want to set aside both the fairness objection and the challenging politics of 
the UBI in the US, and emphasize instead more consequentialist strands of the 
pro-work case against the UBI. 
The heart of that case is set out in Part II: There is psychic, social, and 
economic value to engaging most adults for much of their lives in productive work 
and working relationships, and to keeping work at the center of people’s 
economic and social lives. Meaningful and productive work is worth much more 
to individuals and society than the income it generates. In particular, shared work 
and workplace associations help to hold a diverse society together. That 
argument underscores the critical importance of workplace diversity, and of 
breaking down racial and ethnic barriers to good jobs. 
 
 63.  See Zamora, supra note 36; LUKE MARTINELLI, INST. FOR POL’Y RES., ASSESSING THE CASE 
FOR UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME IN THE UK 50–63 (2017).  
 64.  Jon Elster, Comment on Van der Veen and Van Parijs, 15 THEORY AND SOC’Y 709 (1986). 
 65.  See Van Parijs, supra note 60; VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 11, at 100–32. 
 66.  See Van Parijs, supra note 60, at 121–24. 
 67.  Id. at 124. 
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The historical role of shared work as a source of solidarity and bottom-up 
political engagement should also unsettle the progressive case for a UBI. Unless 
the UBI itself is seen as some kind of endpoint to the need for political 
mobilization among ordinary people, it is important to consider where the seeds 
of solidarity and mobilization can be successfully cultivated. 
It would be nice to believe that individuals, if freed from the bare compulsion 
to work as a UBI aims to do, would enjoy a richer mix of voluntary associations 
that would cultivate social solidarity and connections across persistent lines of 
social division. Some people would surely choose to associate with diverse others, 
and might do so on a more egalitarian basis, outside of work. But we see all 
around us the evidence that many people would choose instead—because they 
often do choose when they can—to live and associate with others from similar 
backgrounds and racial and ethnic identities. It is easier, both for individuals and 
for societies, to build bonds of trust and reciprocity among individuals from 
similar backgrounds and identities. But a diverse society simply has to find ways 
to cultivate bonds across group lines—what Putnam calls “bridging social 
capital”—and that may require the kinds of legal, economic, and organizational 
compulsion that shape the experience of working together. 
The social and political case made here for work, and against the UBI, stands 
apart from fairness concerns; even if it were entirely fair to tax some to subsidize 
others’ choice not to work through a UBI, it would not serve society’s profound 
interest in promoting social integration among citizens, especially across social 
divisions. This case for work also stands up against individual preferences for 
leisure over work; even if many people would genuinely prefer to receive a UBI 
rather than work for a living, the society has good reasons to favor work at least 
to the point of favoring job creation over unconditional income. 
The case for paid work as a site of social integration weighs in favor of 
directing public policy and resources toward creating and maintaining decent jobs 
rather than simply substituting basic income through a UBI. But there is no doubt 
that people at the bottom of the income distribution do need more money (and 
other basic material entitlements like health coverage), for many of the reasons 
offered by UBI advocates. Moreover, a work-centered strategy would become 
much harder to sustain, and a full-scale UBI much more appealing, or even 
imperative, if we eventually do face the tsunami of job destruction that some in 
the tech world foresee. I see the UBI as more of a last resort than as an ideal. For 
the foreseeable future, we can and should strive to maintain work as the 
presumptive basis for individuals’ livelihoods, and as the main mechanism 
through which most people derive most of their income. 
B. A Federal Job Guarantee: Entrenching “Full-time, Full-employment” 
The pro-work case against the UBI might seem to point squarely toward the 
competing idea of a job guarantee, which would afford both a decent income and 
the non-material individual and social benefits of work as a matter of right. The 
idea of a “right to work” has resonated throughout the industrialized world in 
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protean form at least since the French Revolution, especially in times of high 
unemployment.68 In the Depression-era United States, the goal of “full-time, full 
employment” became a central plank of the New Deal (winning out over the goal 
of shorter hours and work spreading, to which I will return below). That goal 
generated New Deal programs like the Civilian Conservation Corps and the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA), but not a true job guarantee. World War 
II brought about full-time, full employment as a collateral consequence; but in its 
wake, and with the rise of a new conservative coalition in Congress, the full-
employment cause lost ground. It suffered a more-than-symbolic defeat when the 
so-called “Full Employment Act” of 1945 was pointedly renamed the 
“Employment Act,” and all of its binding provisions were stripped out.69 
Over the next two decades both the political commitment to full employment 
and its Keynesian underpinnings increasingly gave way to a new macroeconomic 
orthodoxy that prioritized fighting inflation. In the late 1960s, civil rights leaders, 
notably including Coretta Scott King, spearheaded a burst of support for a 
federal commitment to full employment, eventually embodied in the Humphrey-
Hawkins Full Employment Act of 1978.70 The original Humphrey-Hawkins bill 
would have granted an enforceable statutory right to a job; but the bill was 
stripped of its substance before enactment, as with its post-war predecessor. For 
the next four decades we heard barely a whisper in the United States of a “right 
to work” in the strong form of a job guarantee. 
That would change if leading Democrats, including several likely 2020 
presidential aspirants, were to succeed in their recent call for a federal job 
guarantee (FJG). As Senator Bernie Sanders defines it in his draft proposal: 
“Under a federal jobs guarantee program, the U.S. government would guarantee 
a job with a living wage and good benefits to any resident who wants or needs 
one.”71 A job guarantee would in principle bring about a state of permanent full 
employment, with numerous benefits. As outlined by the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities (CBPP) in connection with its proposal, beyond “the elimination 
of involuntary unemployment,” a FJG would bring about “a true floor in the 
labor market”; “the elimination of working poverty”; “the restoration of local 
and state tax bases”; “macroeconomic stabilization”72; and “the provision of 
 
 68.  Philip Harvey, Wage Policies and Funding Strategies for Job Guarantee Programs, in THE JOB 
GUARANTEE: TOWARD FULL EMPLOYMENT 39, 40 (Michael J. Murray & Mathew Forstater eds. 2013); 
see also Peter-Christian Aigner & Michael Brenes, The Long, Tortured History of the Job Guarantee, 
THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 11, 2018, https://newrepublic.com/article/148388/long-tortured-history-job-
guarantee [https://perma.cc/DV6T-G2GR]. 
 69.  See Margaret Weir, Full Employment as a Political Issue in the United States, 54 SOC. RES. 377, 
383–91 (1987). 
 70.  See generally DEAN BAKER ET AL., CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, THE FULL 
EMPLOYMENT MANDATE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE: ITS ORIGINS AND IMPORTANCE (2017). 
 71.  Gregory Krieg, Why a “Federal Jobs Guarantee’ is Gaining Steam with Democrats, CNN.COM, 
(April 26, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/26/politics/federal-jobs-guarantee-gaining-
steam-democrats/index.html [https://perma.cc/SMS7-G2BZ]. 
 72.  The FJG would provide an automatic countercyclical stimulus that ebbed and flowed in inverse 
relation to private sector employment levels.  
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socially useful goods and services” by FJG workers.73 We should read into that 
impressive list of benefits the more intangible social and psychic benefits that 
flow from citizens’ widespread engagement in shared work. 
It is no wonder that the idea of a job guarantee has caught the American 
political imagination as the idea of basic guaranteed income has not. And if the 
menu of policy options miraculously came to include both (and only) the UBI 
and the FJG, I would vote for the latter. But I do want to emphasize this point: 
Even in a future political climate that favored big transformative policies like the 
UBI or the FJG, we would be forced to choose between them. The FJG is in 
direct competition with proposals for a full-scale UBI in at least three ways: They 
are mutually incompatible as a matter of sheer cost, political salability, and 
normative foundations.74 Among other things, backers of a UBI would be seeking 
to reduce the stigma that attaches to unemployment, while backers of a job 
guarantee would be actively burnishing the social valorization of paid work. 
Indeed, a job guarantee itself would likely contribute to the stigmatization of 
unemployment by rendering it more plainly a matter of individual volition. 
For all these reasons, it is fair to assume that a federal job guarantee is an 
alternative, not a complement, to a UBI that is enough to live on. For those who 
strongly favor a UBI, that might be reason enough to resist calls for a job 
guarantee. On the other hand, for those (like me) who are skeptical of the UBI 
precisely because of its displacement and decentering of paid work, the job 
guarantee has an obvious corresponding appeal. 
If super-capable machines do sharply reduce the demand for human labor 
while greatly increasing output, job creation is unlikely to be the whole answer to 
the problem of less work. Nor should it be. In that eventuality, entrenching a 20th 
century goal of full-time, full-employment would not only require climbing an 
ever-steeper slope of job creation; it would also bypass a historic opportunity to 
reduce (without zeroing out) the portion of people’s lives that must be devoted 
to work. Work itself has social value; but many people—especially those whose 
work is not as intrinsically rewarding as that of the writer and readers of this 
article—might wish for less work rather than guaranteed full-time work, putting 
aside the income trade-off.75 In short, the big idea of a FJG would address two 
crucial dimensions of a balanced life and an equitable society—adequate work 
and adequate income—but would fall short on the third dimension by failing to 
reap and distribute the benefits of leisure, or time for family, friends, avocational 
 
 73.  MARK PAUL ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, THE FEDERAL JOB 
GUARANTEE—A POLICY TO ACHIEVE PERMANENT FULL EMPLOYMENT (2018). 
 74.  See supra at note 55. 
 75.  The FJG could allow for part time jobs at the option of the applicant (as does the LEI proposal 
explored here, infra). Still, a FJG norm of 40 hours per week would tend to shore up that norm across 
the economy. Moreover, for reasons explained below, unless the part-time option is coupled with some 
form of income support, most low-income workers will not be able to afford it. By contrast, a FJG 
program that guaranteed, e.g., a thirty-hour per week job could help to reset the norm for working hours 
(while reducing the cost of the program and the number of expected participants). That is one possible 
version of what I call a “three-dimensional” strategy for a future of less work. See infra, part III.  
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pursuits, volunteer work, and everything else that makes up a good life outside 
of work. I will return to that point below. 
As with the UBI, crucial design issues would affect the outcomes of a FJG as 
well as its political and economic viability. Let us dig into a few of the details by 
way of a proposal by the Levy Economics Institute (LEI).76 The structure of the 
LEI proposal is simpler than that of the CBPP; in particular, its uniform wage 
and benefit package makes it easier to analyze.77 The LEI program would be 
federally funded but locally administered; projects would be proposed and 
managed by state and local governments and non-profit organizations, which 
would serve as the direct employers. Jobs would be located in applicants’ own 
communities, and would require little education or prior training. Each would 
pay a uniform wage of $15 per hour plus benefits, including fully-funded health 
benefits, child care, and paid family leave, and would come with for-cause job 
security. For present purposes, we can adopt the LEI’s own estimate of the total 
wage-benefit cost at $18 per hour (though that estimate appears quite 
conservative).78 
One problem with the LEI version of the job guarantee is that it would double 
down on the increasingly problematic U.S. strategy of attaching basic social 
benefits like health insurance to employment. As I have argued elsewhere, that 
linkage contributes counterproductively to employers’ incentive to replace 
employees with independent contractors, outside suppliers, or machines.79 And 
it contributes to the stratification of society into insiders employed by reputable 
employers and outsiders who are employed by marginal organizations or not 
employed at all. The linkage between basic benefits and employment is not 
necessarily inherent in the concept of a FJG, but it is not a purely contingent 
feature either. Both that linkage and the FJG concept are closely tied to what I 
call elsewhere the “fortress of employment.” 
The main point of the FJG lies in the creation of decent jobs for those who 
are now unemployed, underemployed, or discouraged by the lack of job 
opportunities. No less important, however, would be the dramatic effects—
intended and unintended—on jobs outside the FJG program. Because any 
eligible individual could get a job with the prescribed FJG package of pay and 
benefits,80 that package would effectively become the floor on wages and benefits 
 
 76.  L. RANDALL WRAY ET AL., LEVY ECON. INST. OF BARD COLL., PUBLIC SERVICE 
EMPLOYMENT: A PATH TO FULL EMPLOYMENT (2018), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/rpr_4_18.pdf 
[hereinafter, LEI REPORT] [https://perma.cc/2QZQ-GVXR]. The LEI calls its program Public Service 
Employment; they put it forward as one version of a FJG. 
 77.  Both the LEI and CBPP proposals are dissected and comprehensively critiqued in MAX 
GULKER, AM. INST. FOR ECON. RESEARCH, THE JOB GUARANTEE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 14–15 
(2018), albeit from a perspective that is more sanguine about existing labor market dynamics and more 
hostile to big government interventions in the economy than mine.   
 78.  I question that assumption below, see infra Part III. 
 79.  See Estlund, What Should We Do After Work?, supra note 1. 
 80.  Presumably that would be any adult citizen or permanent resident with work authorization. 
Others have explored the practical and political challenges that immigration poses for either a UBI or a 
FJG – or, for that matter, for any serious effort to expand social support for those at the bottom of the 
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in the private sector.81 Employers wishing to hire or retain workers would have 
to meet the new higher floor, which would be enforced—far more effectively than 
any system of official sanctions or litigation—by workers’ exit from lower-wage 
jobs into FJG jobs. In other words, the FJG would effectively raise the federal 
minimum wage to the FJG floor. That would amount to more than a doubling of 
the minimum wage in the large parts of the country currently governed by the 
federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, and a very large increase in all but a 
handful of high-wage, high-cost cities. 
For FJG proponents, the dramatic improvement in wages and benefits at the 
bottom of the labor market—both within and outside the program—is one of its 
most appealing features. Unfortunately, some lower-wage private-sector jobs, 
instead of being upgraded, would disappear because employers were not willing 
or able to meet the new floor—or because the much higher cost of labor tipped 
the scales toward automation.82 And the growing capabilities and falling cost of 
technology vis-a-vis labor will almost certainly increase the magnitude of non-
FJG job losses. In the case of the FJG, private sector job losses would not yield 
unemployment; the FJG program would simply expand to absorb displaced 
individuals. But it would yield a large-scale displacement of private sector jobs 
by federally guaranteed jobs that might raise other concerns. It also raises 
questions about the expected size of the program. 
It is inherent in the concept of a FJG that the size of the program would be 
determined not ex ante, based on policymakers’ willingness to appropriate some 
particular level of funds, but by how many eligible individuals chose to take up 
the FJG option. That is the point of a public job guarantee versus a public job 
creation policy. It is also the program’s greatest source of vulnerability. 
Obviously and by design, an FJG would draw in a large share of the 
unemployed, of “discouraged workers” who have given up looking for a job, and 
of part-time workers who would prefer full-time work but cannot get it on the 
existing market. The LEI estimates that this would include 12.6 million to 17.4 
million individuals as of 2018.83 
The FJG would also draw in some workers who are currently employed full-
time but whose wages and benefits fell short of the new FJG floor. The question 
is how many of those lower-wage jobs would be upgraded and how many would 
instead disappear in the face of what amounts to a very large minimum wage 
 
income distribution. See generally, James Davis, Opinion, Reconciling UBI with Immigration Concerns, 
BASIC INCOME EARTH NETWORK (Sept. 21, 2016), https://basicincome.org/news/2016/09/reconciling-
ubi-immigration-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/845B-54YP]; Kevin D. Williamson, The UBI and 
Immigration, NAT’L REV. (June 10, 2016, 7:59 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/how-
immigration-concerns-undermined-ubi/ [https://perma.cc/N4JG-GLNS]. I do not attempt to take on that 
challenging set of issues here. 
 81.  That is apart from undocumented workers, who would be ineligible for any politically 
imaginable rendition of a job guarantee, and would presumably work for less than the guaranteed wage 
and benefit package. The implications of this exception is not addressed by the LEI analysis, nor do I 
address it here. 
 82.  See Appendix.   
 83.  LEI REPORT, supra note 76, at 17–18. 
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hike.84 The LEI, for its part, takes a polar position in the vigorous debate among 
labor economists over the extent to which minimum wage hikes destroy jobs: It 
assumes that virtually no jobs—and none of those paying more than the current 
federal minimum wage—would disappear in response to more than a doubling of 
the effective minimum wage. On that assumption, virtually no current full-time 
employees would enter the FJG program because nearly all of those jobs would 
be raised to the FJG threshold.85 That seems like a heroic assumption, and a very 
consequential one. If, say, ten percent (or twenty-five percent) of jobs currently 
paying below the FJG threshold disappeared through offshoring, automation, or 
otherwise, instead of being upgraded, then another seven million (or seventeen 
million) more workers would be expected to enter the FJG program from among 
the currently employed.86 
All told, a FJG program along the lines outlined here might draw in twenty 
to thirty million participants in today’s labor market, at an annual cost far in 
excess of the LEI’s estimate of $409 to $543 billion.87 And that is at a time of 
historically low unemployment; both participation levels and budgetary outlays 
would balloon (by design) in a recession—or in the event of escalating job losses 
due to automation.88 The sheer magnitude of a FJG program also raises doubts—
from the labor-friendly Economic Policy Institute, no less—as to whether there 
is enough “public sector managerial capacity” to administer such a program.89 
I will set aside here the obvious question of how to finance such a program, 
and simply assume it would be possible to foot the very large bill that a FJG 
would entail through some combination of new revenue sources—taxes on 
 
 84.  I discuss this hotly debated question in Estlund, What Should We Do?, supra note 1, at 295–97. 
 85.  Specifically, just 25 percent of those now employed at or below the federal minimum wage, or 
another 160,000 participants. LEI REPORT, supra note 76, at 16. As for the large share of the national 
labor force that is currently employed above the federal minimum wage ($7.25) but below the FJG 
threshold, the LEI assumes that none would enter the program because all of their employers would raise 
wages and benefits at least to the FJG threshold (or that any minor job losses would be offset by new 
jobs due to the economic stimulus inherent in the program). Id. at 1, 6. The proposal thus counts no 
expected participants from that group of low-but-above-minimum wage workers. Id. at 16. I report my 
own “back-of-the-envelope” estimates of likely FJG participants in the Appendix. 
 86.  See Appendix. 
 87.  LEI REPORT, supra note 76, at 29. By way of comparison, the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities puts a $543 billion annual price tag on its proposal, and the Center for American Progress 
estimates $158 billion annual outlays for its program. CTR. ON BUDGET, supra note 49, at 11–12; Neera 
Tanden et al., Toward a Marshall Plan for America: Rebuilding Our Towns, Cities, and the Middle Class, 
CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (May 16, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/ 
reports/2017/05/16/432499/toward-marshall-plan-america/ [https://perma.cc/C847-ZUMF]. 
 88.  It would obviously be possible to shrink that large bill by tweaking the program. In particular, 
reducing the wage and benefit level—either across the board or in lower-cost localities—would lower 
both the cost per participant and the number of expected participants. 
 89.  Josh Bivens, How Do Our Job Creation Recommendations Stack up against a Federal Jobs 
Guarantee?, ECON. POLICY INST.: WORKING ECON. BLOG (April 12, 2018, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.epi.org/blog/how-do-our-job-creation-recommendations-stack-up-against-a-job-guarantee/ 
[https://perma.cc/8UM4-G9WA]. 
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income, capital, wealth, consumption, or financial transactions.90 Would it be 
worth it, assuming it were somehow possible? 
FJG proponents rightly point out that its costs would be partly offset by large 
savings on existing programs that serve the working poor and the unemployed—
Medicaid, food stamps, unemployment benefits, Earned Income Tax Credits, 
among others.91 Moreover, the FJG would have a wide range of tangible and 
intangible benefits. Tens of millions of non-FJG workers would get a sizable 
raise. The additional purchasing power of FJG participants not only would raise 
living standards for them and their families, but would inject an economic 
stimulus into poor communities where job opportunities have been scarce, and 
might yield private sector job gains.92 FJG jobs would also deliver some services 
and address community needs (as judged by the local governments and non-
profit entities that created the jobs) in those same needy communities. As 
important, though impossible to quantify, would be the gains in public health, 
crime reduction, and overall social well-being in a society in which everyone who 
wants a decent job has one. 
I make no effort here to tally up the overall costs and gains from a FJG, if that 
is even possible to do. But it is worth noting that most of the FJG’s benefits 
accumulate job by job, and do not hinge on the guarantee dimension of the FJG. 
Any sizable public investments that create low-skilled or semi-skilled jobs would 
boost incomes, psychic well-being, and social engagement of previously non-
working individuals, reduce other social welfare expenditures, and deliver 
needed services. To be sure, a large public jobs program alone would not 
automatically reset the floor on wages and benefits in the rest of the economy as 
a FJG would do; but it would put upward pressure on those wages. 
Some of the costs of the FJG—especially the sheer budgetary outlays—are 
similarly cumulative as opposed to hinging on the guarantee. But the daunting 
open-endedness of the cost and size of the program is directly traceable to the 
guarantee feature. The guarantee feature also creates some of the practical 
challenges of the FJG: What does it mean for the federal government to 
guarantee a job to anybody who seeks one? The LEI version of the FJG avoids 
massively inflating the size of the federal workforce by delegating job creation 
and the role of employer to local governments and private organizations. But 
how is the guarantee to function in that model? Who would ensure that the least 
skilled or most scarred applicants are not ignored by sponsoring organizations? 
 
 90.  Or we could dispense with the conventional demand to identify revenue sources and just spend 
the money, pursuant to the unorthodox precepts of “modern monetary theory” to which some FJG 
proponents adhere. See Cullen O. Roche, Understanding the Modern Monetary System (Aug. 5, 2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1905625 [https://perma.cc/HWJ5-GCP2]. For a 
concise critique of that school of thought, see Paul Krugman, Opinion, MMT, Again, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
15, 2011), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/mmt-again/ [https://perma.cc/M5YU-QZD8]. 
 91.  Though we will return to the question whether all those programs would survive in a FJG world. 
 92.  As with the UBI, some critics predict inflation due to the massive infusion of purchasing power 
into the economy. The LEI’s modeling predicts only a temporary and manageable inflationary effect, see 
LEI REPORT, supra note 76, at 6. 
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Or that jobs are real versus a scam on the federal fisc? Some kind of federal 
oversight, reaching down to the local level, would presumably be required. 
The guarantee dimension of the FJG also raises questions about the quality 
of the public services that would be delivered through the program, for it pegs 
job creation to whatever skills applicants have rather than the skills required to 
deliver needed services.93 There is undoubtedly a lot of work that needs doing in 
our society and that is undersupplied by market mechanisms—from physical 
infrastructure to green energy generation to health care, elder and child care, and 
early education. But much of that work requires vetting, training, experience, and 
dedication. Those demands are out of sync with the concept of a job guarantee.94 
I will return to this point in Part IV. 
So, too, the guarantee feature of the FJG might elicit some troubling behavior 
on the part of participants. What happens when participants fail to perform? If 
they are fired, are they immediately eligible for another guaranteed job? What if 
it happens again? And what happens when the federal government announces to 
everyone, especially young people, that they will be guaranteed a job with good 
wages and benefits no matter how little they do to acquire useful skills or to 
perform well at whatever jobs they do get? Unsettling questions like this might 
be brushed aside on the theory that people are just better than that—better than 
most economists give them credit for being. But a job guarantee seems 
guaranteed to elicit some opportunism.95 
Consider, too, that a job guarantee might readily slide into an implicit job 
mandate, and condition or restrict access to other social welfare benefits. That is 
not what the proponents of a job guarantee have in mind.96 But the step from job 
guarantee to job mandate might be politically irresistible. If the federal 
government were prepared to underwrite a decent job with benefits to everyone 
who is willing and able to work, would the public be willing to provide costly 
benefits to individuals who chose not to take up that offer of a job? The 
presumptive availability of a job for all would compete with and potentially 
undercut popular support for basic benefits like health coverage or housing or 
food aid for the poor (except for those judged strictly unable to work). 
Another problem that plagues the concept of a job guarantee is that of 
“make-work”—work that produces little or nothing that is of actual social value.97 
 
 93.  See Jonathan Chait, Democrats Are Rushing Into a Job Guarantee. It Could Be a Huge Mistake, 
N.Y. MAGAZINE (Apr. 25, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/04/democrats-are-rushing-a-jobs-
guarantee-its-a-huge-mistake.html [https://perma.cc/E5AY-DBSB]. 
 94.  The CBPP Job Guarantee Proposal, supra note 73, would mitigate that problem by providing 
for a range of wage rates corresponding to skill level in lieu of a uniform wage level; that makes the 
program more complex but in other ways superior. 
 95.  GULKER, supra note 77, at 14–15; Wendell Gordon, The Job Guarantee Revisited, 31 J. ECON. 
ISSUES 826, 832–33 (1997). 
 96.  See L. Randall Wray et al., LEVY ECON. INST. OF BARD COLL., Guaranteed Jobs Through a 
public Service Employment Program: Policy Note, 2018,  
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/pn_18_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U53P-6S4S].  
 97.  See A jobs guarantee is a flawed idea, THE ECONOMIST (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/05/10/a-jobs-guarantee-is-a-flawed-idea 
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Jobs that are perceived as make-work might not provide the array of psychic 
benefits that are ascribed to work (and might undercut public support for the 
program). And if make-work includes jobs that could be better or more cheaply 
done by machines, the problem would grow with galloping automation 
capabilities. The bigger the job gap that has to be filled by the federal guarantee—
that is, the more that job creation lags behind job destruction in the private 
sector—the bigger the make-work problem. More FJG jobs will look and feel like 
make-work, and the cost of funding them will be greater. 
Some of these problems are surmountable and, in any case, may seem minor 
alongside the extraordinary benefits of the job guarantee. But together they raise 
serious concerns about the practicality of a true job guarantee even apart from 
its very large and open-ended fiscal impact. Importantly, almost all of these 
problems stem from the guarantee feature rather than from ersus public job 
creation itself.98 And all of them would be magnified in the event that automation 
proves to be a net job destroyer. 
At bottom, the FJG concept seems to rest on an assumption that the job 
deficit—as reflected in numbers of unemployed, underemployed, and 
discouraged workers—will remain within historical bounds, with a cyclical 
component and a fairly stable structural component. But if we are facing a future 
of declining overall demand for human labor (or for the kinds of labor that most 
humans can muster), then an open-ended job guarantee might be impossible both 
to afford and to implement. And if we do face a future of less work, does the 
answer really lie in a commitment to full-time, full employment? Better answers 
might begin in seeing an opportunity rather than only a threat in declining 
demand for human labor. 
C. Reviving the Shorter Hours Movement? 
If we do face a future of scarce job opportunities, one logical response would 
be to spread the work that remains, and increase leisure, by reducing hours per 
worker. If that could be done without reducing incomes at the bottom of the labor 
market, as with past reductions in working hours, it would largely defuse the 
problem of reduced demand for human labor. Beyond that, it would enable 
people to live lives less dominated by work and more congenial to other life 
pursuits. And it would do so without either sacrificing the socially integrative role 
of work (as the UBI risks doing) or massively expanding the federal share of the 
labor market (as the FJG would do). Some scholars and advocates tout this 
strategy as an overdue revival of labor’s historic campaign for shorter hours and 
as “better than basic income.”99 A recent UK report, “The Shorter Work Week: 
 
[https://perma.cc/F6VC-Z25F]; Chait, supra note 94. 
 98.  Josh Bivens at the Economic Policy Institute makes this same point in comparing the EPI’s job 
creation policies to the job guarantee. See Josh Bivens, How do our job creation recommendations stack 
up against a job guarantee?, Economic Policy Institute, Working Economics Blog, (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.epi.org/blog/how-do-our-job-creation-recommendations-stack-up-against-a-job-guarantee/ 
[https://perma.cc/J6BJ-ARKH].  
 99.  See generally, Dimick, supra note 7; BENJAMIN KLINE HUNNICUTT, FREE TIME: THE 
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A Radical and Pragmatic Proposal,” portrays shorter hours as the answer to a 
variety of ills, including the expected flood of job losses from automation.100 
Given the current wave of automation anxiety, it is surprising that the strategy 
of reducing working hours has thus far been overshadowed, at least in the US, by 
its two flashier rivals. The quest for progressively shorter working hours was a 
raison d’etre of the US labor movement from its origins through the New Deal; 
and during that first century or so of organizing and agitation, the idea of work 
sharing through shorter hours rose to the fore, as in the Great Depression, 
whenever unemployment rose. That idea seems due for a revival if automation-
related job losses begin to mount.101 
The strengths and weaknesses of the “big idea” of spreading work by reducing 
hours are quite different than those of the UBI and the FJG and can best be 
appreciated in light of the historical rise and fall of the movement for shorter 
hours in the United States. Let us begin at what turns out to have been—at least 
up to now—the virtual end of that history: the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA).102 The FLSA established a standard work week of forty hours for much 
of the private sector labor market. It was notoriously partial in its reach and 
excluded many workers at both the higher and lower ends of the labor market. 
The “white collar exceptions” for managers, administrators, and professionals—
which reach well down the income scale—have contributed to the “long hours 
culture” that prevails in the United States.103 The low-end exclusions for domestic 
and agricultural workers (later narrowed but not eliminated104) relegated most 
African-Americans to near-feudal conditions of work in the Jim Crow South.105 
Even for those within its reach, the FLSA failed to actually cap hours of work, 
opting instead for a taxation strategy: time-and-a-half pay for hours beyond forty 
per week. That is a bit of a puzzle because, up to the New Deal, organized labor 
had long sought to regulate hours of work through maximum hours laws. The 
federal courts had blocked those laws (with some exceptions for “vulnerable” 
groups of workers like women, minors, and miners106) on the ground that they 
 
FORGOTTEN AMERICAN DREAM, 148–53 (2013) [hereinafter, FREE TIME]; 
 100.  The Shorter Work Week: A Radical and Pragmatic Proposal (Will Stronge & Aidan Harper, 
eds.) (2019), http://autonomy.work/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Shorter-working-week-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QJF5-7U5E].  
 101.  See Dimick, supra note 7, at 497–99.   
 102.  29 U.S.C. § 201. 
 103.  Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New Deal Hours 
Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212, 2318–19 (1998); Hours Worked, OECD DATA, 
https://data.oecd.org/emp/hours-worked.htm [https://perma.cc/VL88-PYJG] (2017). 
 104.  Congress extended minimum wage guarantees to agricultural workers in 1966, though the 
agricultural minimum wage remains below the floor in other industries. See Phyllis Palmer, Outside the 
Law: Agricultural and Domestic Workers under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 J. POL’Y HIST., 416, 420–
26 (1995). 
 105.  See generally Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial 
Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1987). 
 106.  Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); Sturges & Burn 
Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913). 
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violated the constitutional “liberty of contract” of both employers and 
employees.107 But after the Supreme Court’s about-face in 1937, the 
constitutional door was wide open for a federal maximum hours law.108 And 
labor’s political clout was then at high tide. Yet New Dealers turned away from 
a cap on hours toward an overtime premium—a softer, more flexible form of 
regulation that encouraged workers to seek longer hours even as it discouraged 
employers from demanding longer hours. At that point the movement for shorter 
working hours, which had been in progress, and had made progress, for a century, 
basically stalled. Since then, the standard work week has remained stuck at forty 
hours; and actual working hours per person have increased, despite many more 
decades of growing productivity and prosperity.109 
Professor Benjamin Hunnicutt, in his wide-ranging study of the U.S. 
movement for shorter working hours,110 recounts that movement’s face-off in the 
midst of the Great Depression against the alternative goal of “full-time, full-
employment.”  Although the shorter hours camp came tantalizing close in 1933 
to winning congressional enactment of a thirty-hour work week (despite then-
formidable constitutional hurdles), the apostles of full-time, full employment 
won out. 111 The FLSA model of a forty-hour work week, with time-and-a-half for 
overtime, took hold, and shorter hours never again gained primacy, either within 
organized labor or among its leading political allies. We have taken brief notice 
above of the historical fate of the commitment to full-time, full employment. 
Consider now the rise and demise of its once-dominant rival, the movement for 
shorter hours of work. 
Once capital and its managers won control of production through the factory 
system in the early 1800s and until the New Deal, the movement for shorter hours 
was the central cause of organized labor. For a good part of a century, the labor 
movement fought for its Ten-Hour System against managers’ efforts to exact 
twelve or more hours a day out of workers, and then for the eight-hour day under 
the slogan “Eight hours for work, eight hours for rest, and eight hours for what 
you will.”112 
The case for shorter hours was multifaceted. Of course, workers sought relief 
from their exhausting physical labors and more time for the rest of what life 
offered. In particular, they sought time for self-improvement and civic education 
 
 107.  Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 108.  West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 109.  See generally FREE TIME, supra note 100, at 183–84; JULIET SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED 
AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE, 17–82 (1991). For analysis of the increased 
participation of women in the workforce and its effects on hours worked, see COUNCIL OF ECON. 
ADVISERS, FAMILIES AND THE LABOR MARKET, 1969-1999: ANALYZING THE “TIME CRUNCH” (1999). 
 110.  BENJAMIN KLINE HUNNICUTT, WORK WITHOUT END: ABANDONING SHORTER HOURS FOR 
THE RIGHT TO WORK (1988) [hereinafter, HUNNICUTT, WORK WITHOUT END]; see also FREE TIME, 
supra note 100. 
 111.  HUNNICUTT, WORK WITHOUT END, supra note 111, at 148–90; see also FREE TIME, supra note 
100, at 109–21; see also Malamud, supra note 104, at 2233–36. 
 112.  Scott D. Miller, Revitalizing the FLSA, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 1 (2001); see WORK 
WITHOUT END, supra note 111, at 9–36. 
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so that they could be better, more active, and more informed citizens. They 
sought time for intellectual, cultural, and political pursuits once reserved to the 
propertied classes.113 The struggle for shorter hours was thus central to organized 
labor’s effort to reconfigure the concept of “free labor” for the industrial age and 
to equip workers for participation in the republican project of self-governance.114 
The case for shorter hours also drew support from the expectation that 
machines would gradually supplant human labor in the productive process. Many 
late 19th and early 20th century observers foresaw, as Marx had, the emergence of 
a technologically advanced economy that could meet all of the material needs of 
the citizenry with only a small fraction of the human labor that was currently 
employed.115 That prospect aroused both anxiety and optimism. On the one hand, 
it raised the specter of mass unemployment and immiseration, not just cyclical 
but chronic. Shorter hours would help to avert that risk and to spread scarce work 
opportunities and wages more fairly. Indeed, if both the remaining human work 
and the outputs of a highly automated and productive economy could be fairly 
distributed—in part through shorter hours—then humanity could transcend the 
economic preoccupations of scarcity, necessity, and competition, and 
democratize the pursuit of humanistic, artistic, and philosophical aims that some 
called “higher progress.”116 
The aspiration to more leisure and higher progress rather than ever greater 
abundance was linked to doubts about the future of capitalism. For some of its 
more radical proponents, the movement for progressively shorter hours indeed 
aimed toward a peaceful revolution—a gradual displacement of capitalism as 
humans spent an ever-shrinking part of their lives as workers under the 
domination of employers, and as the production of necessary goods and services 
occupied an ever-smaller share of human time and energy.117 That was hardly an 
argument calculated to win over capitalism’s defenders to the cause of shorter 
hours. But some, like John Maynard Keynes, sought to square the circle by 
postponing the reckoning. He argued in 1930 that the problem of scarcity would 
be with us, and the prodigious growth machine of capitalism would still be 
needed, for many more decades. But he predicted that “our grandchildren” a 
century hence—that is, in 2030—would need to work no more than fifteen hours 
per week to meet their material needs. Then, “for the first time since his creation 
man will be faced with his real, his permanent problem—how to use his freedom 
from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, which science and 
 
 113.  See William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 
1985 WIS. L. REV., 767, 805–06; FREE TIME, supra note 100, at 70–71.  
 114.  See Forbath, supra note 115, at 800–17. 
 115.  See generally FREE TIME, supra note 100, at 1–12; see also John Maynard Keynes, Possibilities 
for Our Grandchildren, in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 321, 327 (Palgrave Macmillan 2010); Sherman Gwinn, 
Days of Drudgery Will Soon Be Over: An Interview with Walter S. Gifford, AM. MAG., Nov. 1928, 25. 
 116.  See generally FREE TIME, supra note 100, at 48–69; Robert T. Rhode, Culture Followed the Plow, 
However Slowly, 15 KY. PHILOLOGICAL REV. 49 (2001); David D. Anderson, Walt Whitman: Nineteenth-
Century Man, WALT WHITMAN BIRTHPLACE BULLETIN (Apr. 1960), 3–5. 
 117.  See FREE TIME, supra note 100, at 6–7. 
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compound interest will have won for him, to live wisely and agreeably and 
well.”118 
Some arguments for shorter hours were more congenial to pragmatic early 
20th century capitalists: Workers could be more productive, and could better 
reproduce their labor power, with a shorter work day. They might also be more 
avid consumers. As the consumer economy began to take shape, and seemingly 
to supersede the pursuit of “higher progress,” some commentators argued that 
workers needed leisure time in order to perform their increasingly important role 
as consumers.119 Then again, the consumerist case for shorter hours had a 
compelling counterpart on the side of full-time, full employment: A growing 
consumer economy required growing purchasing power. If workers were to draw 
their dividends from a more productive economy in the form of greater leisure 
versus fatter paychecks, would they buy enough stuff to fuel the perpetual growth 
that was coming to be seen as the mission of capitalism? 
Through the New Deal, and until the standard forty-hour work week was an 
accomplished fact, the shorter hours movement was supported by an overlapping 
consensus, with support both among some who hoped to preserve capitalism in 
the face of growing skepticism about its future viability, and among the many 
skeptics themselves. The case for shorter hours was backed by a wide range of 
arguments and by both the fears and the hopes arising from the prospect of 
machines progressively replacing human labor. And working time did indeed 
decline—from an average of 68 hours per week in 1850 to forty hours per week 
in 1950 (in manufacturing).120 
By the time the shorter hours camp set its sights on a thirty-hour work week, 
however, the case for shorter hours began to lose some of its momentum and its 
support. The question became: How short was short enough? Some of the 
movement’s most broadly appealing arguments, such as those based on workers’ 
physical health, well-being, and productivity, began to lose traction with the 
decline in both working hours and the share of the workforce engaged in grueling 
physical labor. Others began to question the more idealized aspirations of the 
shorter hours movement, which came to the fore as the worst evils of long hours 
began to abate. Already in the New Deal, key opinion- and policymakers 
doubted that most people could, would, or even should replace productive work 
with salutary “higher” pursuits.121 They worried about the problem of too much 
leisure—of idle hands making mischief (or rebellion), or of dissipating energies 
that could better be employed in productive work.122 And they questioned 
whether American society—parts of which were only then gaining access to 
electricity—was indeed close to meeting the people’s legitimate material 
 
 118.  See Keynes, supra note 115, at 327. 
 119.  See SCHOR, supra note 109, at 107–38; see FREE TIME, supra note 100, at 114–15. 
 120.  Robert Whaples, Hours of Work in U.S. History, ECON. HISTORY ASS’N, 
https://eh.net/encyclopedia/hours-of-work-in-u-s-history/ [https://perma.cc/SR7X-WSXM]. 
 121.  See WORK WITHOUT END, supra note 111, at 251–65; FREE TIME, supra note 100, at 119–21. 
 122.  See FREE TIME, supra note 100, at 114–15. 
1 BOOK PROOF - ESTLUND - THREE BIG IDEAS (DO NOT DELETE) 8/22/2019  11:19 AM 
No. 3 2019] THREE BIG IDEAS 31 
demands.123 Those concerns led to calls both within the labor movement and 
among public intellectuals and policy makers for revving up the engines of 
production, for making full use of human capital, and for committing to the goal 
of full-time, full employment instead of shorter hours.124 
As the Depression gave way to the all-hands-on-deck preparations for war 
and then war itself, full employment became a national imperative, and the 
movement for shorter hours receded. With the end of the war, after a decade and 
a half of constrained purchasing power, pent-up consumer demand began to fuel 
a long period of economic growth. For the overwhelmingly white and male ranks 
of organized labor, which had always led the shorter hours movement, the goal 
of shorter hours and more leisure time succumbed to the allures of more money 
(partly through more overtime) and more stuff. Instead of more leisure for 
themselves, they sought a “family wage” that would support a stay-at-home 
wife.125 At the same time, the vaguely anti-capitalist currents within the shorter 
hours movement became suspect in the postwar era. As anti-Communism took 
hold, the goal of progressively increasing leisure versus material prosperity—not 
to mention the goal of peacefully overturning capitalism—began to seem un-
American, while capitalists’ own increasingly sophisticated efforts to tap into and 
fuel consumer appetites for greater comforts, luxuries, and status goods took on 
an almost patriotic tinge.126 
Some in organized labor, especially within its small female contingent, sought 
to keep the shorter hours movement alive in the national policy arena,127 and 
some unions secured reduced hours through collective bargaining.128 In the main, 
however, for several decades until the 1970s, ordinary workers secured their 
dividends from growing productivity in the form of higher wages rather than 
more leisure.129 And then a slower but still growing economy ceased to pay those 
dividends to most workers in any form at all.130 That happened for many 
intertwined reasons—deindustrialization, deregulation, declining union density, 
globalization of trade and production, and hypercharged financial markets, 
among others. As wages stagnated, workers and their families began to pile up 
debt, and the once-ascendant goal of shorter hours largely faded from memory. 
 
 123.  See id. at 115; see also Constant Southworth, Can There Be General Overproduction? No!, 32 J. 
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https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap/ [https://perma.cc/EK7U-H87X]. 
 130.  Id. 
1 BOOK PROOF - ESTLUND - THREE BIG IDEAS (DO NOT DELETE) 8/22/2019  11:19 AM 
32 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 82:1 
The onset of wage stagnation and growing debt helps to explain why, in the 
present climate, the kind of across-the-board reduction in working hours that 
workers won in the past looks like no kind of answer to the problems of ordinary 
workers and their families unless it comes with some assurance that incomes will 
not suffer. Nor will it look like a better answer in the future if automation 
proceeds to destroys more decent jobs than it creates and pits those with merely 
ordinary, widely-distributed human skills against each other in the competition 
for decent paid work. Unless workers can be confident that incomes will be at 
least maintained as working hours decline, those most at risk from automation 
are unlikely to coalesce around a goal of shorter hours and work-spreading. 
Unlike the UBI or the FJG, a program of shorter working hours by itself does 
not promise to boost incomes. 
Then again, reductions in working hours were never seen as a whole answer 
to workers’ economic struggles, neither by those struggling workers themselves 
nor by the visionaries of the shorter hours movement. The movement for shorter 
working hours in its heyday was always closely linked with struggles for higher 
hourly wages. Shorter hours were thus to be coupled with higher standards of 
living, and the productivity gains from technological progress were to be widely 
distributed in the form of both greater leisure and greater material prosperity. 
And indeed, in an era of mass industrialization and mass labor mobilization, 
incomes and living standards rose even as weekly working hours fell in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries.131 That was how “creative destruction” worked in an 
expanding industrial economy with a vibrant labor movement. Since the 1970s, 
however, wage rates have become decoupled from economy-wide productivity 
gains as workers’ bargaining power has eroded. If “this time is different” on the 
automation front, then the divergence between productivity gains and median 
wages is likely to grow, and workers’ bargaining power is likely to decline further, 
as emerging technologies destroy decent jobs and depress wages for most 
workers. 
The point here is that the idea of shorter working hours operates on a 
different plane than the big ideas of universal basic income and a job guarantee. 
The latter are proffered as comprehensive yet rival solutions to what ails us in 
today’s highly polarized economy and perhaps especially in a future of job 
scarcity. By contrast, the idea of reducing working hours, standing alone, does 
not pretend to solve the present or future problems of workers. Far from 
foreclosing other strategies such as job creation or income support, the shorter 
hours strategy only works in tandem with some plan for increasing incomes at the 
bottom of the income distribution. Reducing working hours without supporting 
incomes at the bottom of the labor market will only deepen economic woes. Yet 
attempting to recouple wages and productivity gains by fiat—for example, by 
sharply increasing minimum wages—risks accelerating the replacement of human 
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labor with machines. That is a dilemma only if we shut our eyes to multi-
dimensional responses to the socioeconomic problems and risks that we face. 
IV. 
A THREE-DIMENSIONAL STRATEGY FOR A FUTURE OF LESS WORK 
Automation arouses both hopes and fears. Advanced technologies including 
AI, machine learning, 3-D printing, and robotics are likely to pay growing 
dividends in terms of productivity and economic growth. Those developments 
could usher in a long-awaited era of abundance, producing enough goods and 
services to meet human needs with ever less reliance on human labor. The returns 
to innovation could include both higher material living standards and more time 
for leisure, or pursuits other than paid work. 
The question at hand is how to ensure that those returns are distributed 
widely rather than overwhelmingly to the creators and owners of the technology. 
Given a half-century of growing economic inequality and declining returns to 
labor versus capital, along with the growing capacity of machines to compete with 
or surpass humans at a wide range of job tasks, it is clear we cannot count on 
sheer economic growth and “creative destruction” to bring about a tolerable 
distribution of dividends through creation of new and better jobs. Without major 
and costly public interventions, we face a grave risk of growing immiseration and 
political alienation, polarization, and conflict. 
The UBI and the FJG represent bold and sharply divergent strategies for 
averting that dystopic future. The UBI would replace work, at least for some, 
with cash and leisure, or the freedom to not work. But that prescription gives too 
little weight, I think, to the value of work itself, and the distinctive social 
embeddedness and social bonds that form at work. And at least for the 
foreseeable future, the UBI faces prohibitive political odds in the US, given a 
broad and deep cultural attachment to work and aversion to “government 
handouts” to able-bodied adults. 
The FJG is more appealing both normatively and politically in its coupling of 
income and work, broadly accessible to all. But it risks swelling to unmanageable 
proportions if automation begins to yield net job losses. Indeed, the FJG’s built-
in tendency to drive up wages and labor costs across the market is likely to 
accelerate those job losses, putting a growing number of people to work (at 
taxpayer expense) doing things that machines can do better and more cheaply. 
Besides, if that is where we are heading—if we can produce the goods and 
services that we need as a society with much less human labor—then will it really 
make sense to spend hundreds of billions of dollars or more annually to guarantee 
full-time, full-employment? That would seem to sell short the value of the 
increased leisure that could be among the dividends of large-scale automation. 
For its part, the old idea of shorter working hours promises a better balance 
of work and leisure, and is potentially compatible with some version of either 
UBI or FJG. But a shorter-hours strategy standing alone falls short on another 
crucial dimension, for it portends a decline in living standards in case wages 
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continue to stagnate or worse—an eventuality that automation might make more 
likely. 
Each of these three big ideas for a future of less work falls short on one of the 
three dimensions of a good life and a good society that are at stake: meaningful 
work for those who are able, ample time for other pursuits, and a decent material 
standard of living. All three of those dimensions are intrinsically valuable, 
compatible, and potentially achievable across the whole society if “this time is 
different.” But that will require a three-dimensional public policy strategy that 
combines job creation, non-work-based income and benefits, and expanding time 
for pursuits outside of work. What follows here is just a sketch of what a three-
dimensional strategy for a future of less work might look like. 
A. Job Creation versus a Job Guarantee 
Creating jobs—and generating both work and income—for those who are 
able to work but unable to find a decent job is the worthy core objective of the 
FJG. And there is plenty of work that needs doing in our society that can still best 
be done by human beings—public goods and social and community services that 
neither the market economy nor the government is supplying. The difficulties—
not insurmountable but still discouraging—stem from keying the volume and 
nature of job creation to the number and qualifications of job seekers, rather than 
to the work that needs doing. For one thing, as I have observed, the FJG dictates 
an emphasis on jobs requiring little or no training; yet much of the work that 
needs doing requires skill and training (though not necessarily traditional higher 
education). Although better job training programs will not by themselves solve 
the problem of automation-related job displacement, they are clearly necessary. 
Work that requires training is also more likely to be meaningful work. Yet 
significant training periods are at some odds with the FJG concept.132 
To be sure, creating jobs for those left out of a changing economy, and for 
those displaced by growing automation capabilities, should be one goal of any 
sensible program of public job creation. But the central focus should be on 
identifying the unmet needs of the society, creating programs to deliver those 
services, and hiring and training the best people available to do those jobs. 
Job creation should be a priority of government and of public policy, but it is 
obviously not the sole province of government as opposed to the private sector. 
In an era of expanding automation capabilities (as well as financialization, 
fissuring, and global supply chains), public policy must be more deliberate and 
focused on promoting private sector job creation; the past several decades have 
taught us that jobs, and especially decent jobs, do not necessarily accompany 
economic growth. The federal government has macroeconomic and monetary 
tools that tilt more toward job and wage growth versus controlling inflation; and 
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tax policies can tilt firms’ incentives toward employment of labor versus capital 
(or at least undo the perversely opposite tilt of our current tax system).133 
What should be the terms and conditions of employment in new government-
created jobs, and the minimum terms and conditions of private sector jobs? I will 
return below to one set of terms and conditions—those relating to reduced hours 
of work and paid vacations and leaves of various kinds. But what about wages 
and other benefits? In general, the prevailing strategy of worker advocates, 
building on the American social model that evolved in the mid-20th century, has 
been to build into the definition of a good job, and into the obligations of 
employers, virtually everything that a worker and perhaps her dependents need 
by way of material support for a decent life from cradle to grave. That includes 
employer-provided health insurance, parental leave, child care, disability 
insurance, and retirement income. The idea that employers should be required 
to bear not just the costs of reproducing their employees’ labor day to day, but a 
share of the cost of sustaining workers and their families throughout their lives, 
is a persistent theme in progressive politics in the US.134 
Whatever sense that strategy made in an industrial era of long-term job 
tenures, manageable health care costs, and relatively short retirement periods, I 
do not think it can be sustained in a post-industrial and increasingly fissured, 
automated, and globalized economy of shorter job tenures, longer life-spans, and 
attenuated attachments to firms. In particular, that package of job-based 
entitlements taxes the employment of human labor versus capital, including 
technology, and accelerates the automation of work. Those job-related 
entitlements that can be uncoupled from employment should be, and their costs 
should be shifted from employers’ payrolls to a more redistributive revenue base 
that does not discourage employment.135 That strategy should also be reflected in 
the second dimension of a sensible strategy for facing a future of less work: 
spreading both work and leisure by reducing individuals’ annual and lifetime 
hours of work. 
B. Spreading Work and Leisure 
Among the social dividends of automation will be the possibility of expanding 
leisure, or time for activities other than paid work. And among the challenges of 
automation will be maintaining enough paid work for all those who are willing 
and able to work. During past periods of job scarcity such as the Great 
Depression, the answer lay in shorter working hours for all. But reducing the 
work-week across the board to, say, thirty hours does not suit all workers and 
makes little sense for many of those with satisfying jobs that call for scarce skills. 
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We could introduce greater flexibility by using the existing FLSA template for a 
shorter work week—that is, an overtime premium versus a cap on hours—or by 
continuing to exclude some categories of skilled workers. Either might better 
accommodate different needs and preferences—though perhaps mainly those of 
employers. In a possible future of large net job losses, we will need to consider 
shorter hours across the board (and more generous income support). But we are 
not there yet. 
So before calling for a revival of the New Deal movement for a thirty-hour 
work week, let us consider a set of modest but meaningful steps—steps that make 
sense now—toward spreading both work and time off of work. We should, first, 
catch up with virtually every developed country in the world by expanding access 
to paid leaves, vacations, or other respites from work; second, expand access to 
voluntary part-time schedules; and third, improve our system of retirement 
security. All of these measures would allow those who want to work less or retire 
from paid work to do so; they would spread work while distributing leisure 
through hours, weeks, or months off work as it suits the needs of individuals and 
their families. 
First, we can reduce total working hours by providing access to paid leaves 
for family and medical reasons—caring for oneself or one’s children or elderly 
parents—and for annual paid vacations. Employers should be required to grant 
those designated vacations and leaves and to protect the employee’s job upon her 
return—much as the Family and Medical Leave Act now does, but for an 
expanded range of purposes. And employees should be paid (in whole or in part) 
during those leaves and vacations; that is part of how incomes can be maintained 
even with fewer hours of work. But instead of funding paid leaves through a 
payroll tax (as most extant proposals would do), they should be paid or at least 
subsidized through public funding that is detached from employers’ payrolls. 
I have explained the logic of this approach elsewhere,136 and it follows from 
what I have said above. The goal is three-fold: to (a) maintain workers’ incomes 
while both (b) reducing working time and (c) preserving work by reducing the 
tax on use of firms’ human labor and the incentive to replace workers with 
machines. If we compel employers to bear the full burden of maintaining 
workers’ incomes while reducing working time, that will either come out of 
employees’ own incomes or inexorably, if incrementally, tilt employers’ calculus 
toward reducing payrolls through automation.137 A program of publicly funded 
leaves and vacation time would supply at least part of the income that would 
otherwise be lost in reducing working hours. 
Beyond affording paid leaves and vacations, we should also require 
employers to accommodate employee requests for part-time work—with a pro-
 
 136.  See Estlund, What Should We Do?, supra note 1. 
 137.  Economists vary as to who actually pays for payroll-funded benefits; the conventional wisdom 
is that employees pay through lower wages down to the minimum wage, at which point employees 
effectively bear the burden in the form of job losses. But the picture is more complex, as I briefly explore 
in Estlund, supra note 1, at 289–90. 
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rata reduction in salary—in all but exceptional cases.138 That would tend to spread 
work while improving work-family or work-life balance for those who want to 
and can afford to work less. In the case of parents with young children, that option 
could be made more widely available, even for those who cannot afford the loss 
of pay, by coupling the mandatory accommodation of parents’ requests for 
shorter hours with salary replacement.139 But the salary replacement, whether full 
or partial, should be funded out of public revenues, not payroll taxes, for reasons 
explained above. Expanding access to part time work for those who choose it is 
a sensible step toward work-spreading and reducing total hours per employee in 
a way that is responsive to individuals’ particular needs and preferences.140 
Another route toward work-spreading and greater leisure—still instead of or 
before pursuing the one-size-fits-all strategy of reducing the standard work 
week—is making earlier retirements feasible for those who want to retire. Our 
current patchwork system of retirement security is in tatters, as Professor 
Katherine Newman demonstrates in a recent book.141 That forces individuals to 
keep working long after they had hoped to retire, often in jobs for which they are 
overqualified as well as underpaid.142 This dynamic will become ever more 
perverse if “this time is different”; younger workers will need those jobs. But 
encouraging earlier retirements will require reforming our system of retirement 
security. For those at the bottom of the income distribution, that might be 
achieved through a negative income tax, or improvements to the Social Security 
system (with its modest “defined-benefit” pension system for all). 
The harder question is whether deferred income for retirement should 
continue to be part of what employers are expected to provide to their workers. 
I am skeptical for reasons that should be evident: that funding strategy taxes and 
discourages employment in what might be an impending era of job scarcity due 
to automation. Yet the politics of turning retirement income from something that 
one earns over the course of one’s working life to a government entitlement 
(supplemented by whatever one can save on one’s own) gives me pause. I 
recognize that the challenge is not unique to retirement income; it meets other 
 
 138.  That is, only in exceptional cases could the employer either refuse the request or condition 
approval on a reduction in pay or responsibility.   
 139.  As Sweden has done for more than four decades. See Anna Amilon, On the sharing of temporary 
parental leave: the case of Sweden, 5 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 385 (2007).  
 140.  It is not without complications. For one, accommodating family responsibilities that fall 
disproportionately on women may be in tension with the pursuit of gender equity. Well-designed 
programs can minimize that tension. See Rebecca Ray, et al., Parental Leave Policies in 21 Countries, 
CENTER FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, June 2009, available at http://cepr.net/documents/ 
publications/parental_2008_09.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZXH5-LP66]. See also Crain, supra note 127, at 
1931–32. 
 141.  See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, DOWNHILL FROM HERE: RETIREMENT INSECURITY IN AN AGE 
OF INEQUALITY (2019), and my review of it, Cynthia Estlund, Why retirement is no longer a time of 
relaxation and security, WASH. POST, (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/why-
retirement-is-no-longer-a-time-of-relaxation-and-security/2019/01/31/f5ae4082-1453-11e9-90a8-
136fa44b80ba_story.html?utm_term=.0390e0987382 [https://perma.cc/L6DH-WZPU]. 
 142.  See NEWMAN, supra note 144, at 47–76. 
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aspects of my proposed three-dimensional strategy that would shift costs, 
benefits, and burdens off the platform of employment and onto a broader and 
richer funding base. But the challenge seems most acute in the case of retirement 
income, perhaps because the logic of earning retirement income through work is 
most compelling there. For now, it might make sense to retain that central 
principle and to focus reform efforts elsewhere.  Beyond shoring up pensions for 
poorer retirees, we should reform the regulatory system on two fronts: enforcing 
existing promises of retirement security and nudging future retirees and plan 
sponsors back toward “defined benefit” pensions that deliver actual retirement 
security.143 The massive shift in the past several decades toward “defined 
contribution” pension plans leaves retirees too exposed to financial downturns as 
well as their own lack of foresight and investment savvy. 
In combination, all of these prescriptions for affording more time off work 
would not cast a heavy burden on employers, as employers would not bear the 
burden of salary replacement for the time not worked. Together these measures 
would tend to spread both work and leisure more widely without either 
significantly increasing the marginal cost of labor versus machines or significantly 
reducing workers’ incomes. 
Down the road, if “this time is different,” and if public job creation fails to 
keep pace with mounting job losses, more aggressive work spreading measures 
might be in order. It might make sense in that case to subsidize earlier retirement, 
or to reduce the standard work week—either generally or initially in government-
funded jobs—to thirty hours or even less. Shorter working hours would still not 
be the answer to job scarcity, but rather one dimension of a three-dimensional 
strategy that aims to balance and spread the benefits, individual and social, of 
engagement in paid work, time off of work, and decent standards of living. So 
shorter hours would have to be coupled with increases in non-work-based income 
sources. 
C. Raising the Floor on Material Living Standards 
Recent decades of growing inequality and wage stagnation make it clear that, 
even if automation yields big productivity gains, we cannot count on wage growth 
to maintain adequate incomes in a world of less work, as we mostly did in the 
past. Nor should we rely too heavily on minimum wage increases to boost 
incomes at the bottom; large minimum wage increases are likely to destroy jobs, 
especially for the least skilled workers and especially in an era of galloping 
automation capabilities.144 Public job creation would help; an injection of new 
government-funded and decently-paid jobs for low- and medium-skilled workers 
 
 143.  On top of that foundation, there is a role for “defined contribution” plans that give workers a 
share of equity—not just in their own companies, but in a swath of businesses that are poised to capture 
the lion’s share of gains from technological innovation. This notion is far beyond the scope of this article, 
but is explored in other works, including JOSEPH R. BLASI, ET AL., THE CITIZEN’S SHARE: REDUCING 
INEQUALITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2014). 
 144.  I address the point in What Should We Do?, supra note 1, at 295. 
1 BOOK PROOF - ESTLUND - THREE BIG IDEAS (DO NOT DELETE) 8/22/2019  11:19 AM 
No. 3 2019] THREE BIG IDEAS 39 
would tend to raise wage levels at the bottom of the labor market. But there is 
clearly a need for some form of material support for those at the bottom of the 
income scale—especially if we aim to distribute some of the dividends from 
greater productivity in the form of leisure, or time off paid work. 
Debates over the ideal shape of a social welfare system mainly break along 
two lines: between in-kind or cash benefits, and between universal and means-
tested benefits. Those two dichotomies create four cells into which we could put 
just about every existing or proposed form of social provision. In-kind, means-
tested programs include public housing and housing vouchers and food stamps; 
in-kind universal programs would include “Medicare for All” and free basic 
education. Cash benefits might be universal, like a partial or total UBI, or means-
tested, like the earned income tax credit (EITC) or a negative income tax. 
Obviously, there are many possible paths forward, if we could summon the 
collective political will; and political considerations might weigh in favor of some 
paths over others. 
One appealing model is sometimes called “universal basic services.”145 It 
would provide basic services—such as “shelter, sustenance, health and care, 
education, local transport, information access, and legal & democracy 
support”—on a universal basis, separate from employment, while otherwise 
retaining the link between income and work.146 That alternative approach, which 
has a kinship with European “flexicurity” policies,147 would simultaneously 
promote job preservation and creation by reducing the tax on employment, and 
protect those who are stuck in precarious or patchy employment, in the growing 
gig economy, or with no paid work at all. A major step in that direction in the US 
context would be toward some form of universal, single-payer health coverage 
and away from our historic reliance on employer-provided health care benefits. 
My aim here is not to redesign our entitlement system but to underscore three 
points: First, a large and growing part of the working population is likely to need 
material support apart from wages to maintain decent standards of living. 
Second, any program to do that should be work-friendly and compatible with 
substantial public investments in job creation. Third, insofar as those at the top 
of the economy are going to be drawing a growing share of the gains from a more 
automated economy, it is fair and even imperative that they also bear a much 
greater share of the cost of both kinds of public interventions. 
 
 145.  See UNIVERSAL BASIC SERVICES, (April 2, 2019), available at: 
https://universalbasicservices.org/ [https://perma.cc/MKM8-R7NF].  
 146.  See Barbara R. Bergmann, A Swedish-Style Welfare State or Basic Income: Which Should Have 
Priority?, in Eric Olin Wright (ed.), REDESIGNING DISTRIBUTION: BASIC INCOME AND STAKEHOLDER 
GRANTS AS CORNERSTONES FOR AN EGALITARIAN CAPITALISM 130–142 (2006).  
 147.  See Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion, Flexicurity, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=102&langId=en [https://perma.cc/CPZ2-457T].  
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Automation has been going on throughout the history of capitalism and has 
yielded extraordinary gains in the form of higher living standards, less grueling 
and dangerous work, longer life spans, and greater leisure.148 But the current 
wave of labor-replacing technology might lead to net job losses, sharper labor 
market polarization, or both. We should be looking over the horizon, and 
devising strategies to ensure that the gains from super-smart machines flow not 
only to their owners and creators but to those who are likely to be displaced by 
those technologies, and who might otherwise be left behind. Big and bold ideas 
are now thinkable and speakable, and might even become politically feasible, as 
we begin to face up to a future of less work. But big and bold ideas need not come 
in a single neat package like the UBI or the FJG, or even the idea of shorter 
hours—nearly forgotten but due for a comeback. Each of those three big ideas 
falls short on one of the three desiderata of an inclusive and prosperous economy: 
meaningful productive work, a decent material standard of living, and adequate 
time for life outside of work – or jobs, income, and leisure, to put it too simply. 
We should be looking to balance all three of those desiderata, and to ensure 
broad access to all three, through a three-dimensional response to a future of less 
work. 
  
 
 148.  See GORDON, supra note 131. 
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APPENDIX:  
ESTIMATING THE SIZE AND COST OF A FJG 
This appendix explains the two points on which my very rough estimation of 
the likely size and cost of a FJG along the lines proposed by the Levy Economics 
Institute (LEI) diverges from the LEI’s own estimate: 
Regarding the expected number of FJG participants from among currently 
employed full-time workers: By my reckoning, that number would depend on two 
other numbers—a denominator and a numerator: how many existing jobs now 
fall below the new FJG threshold?; and how many of those jobs would likely 
disappear or be vacated rather than being upgraded to the new floor? 
The denominator is comparatively easy to estimate. The FJG wage and 
benefit package of $18 per hour approximates the median US wage rate as of 
mid-2017.149 (That median does not count benefit costs, which are substantial, see 
infra notes 157 through 158 and accompanying text). But given the LEI’s low 
estimate of the FJG benefit costs (questioned below), it seems defensible for this 
very rough set of estimates, to discount benefit costs in existing jobs as well.) That 
suggests that close to half of all US workers, or some 70 million people, might be 
tempted to switch to a FJG job unless their employer raised wages and benefits 
to at least the FJG threshold. (Employers would also have to match or make up 
for the FJG’s job security provision, currently rare in private sector jobs but 
highly valued by many workers.) That suggests an upper-bound denominator of 
70 million existing jobs that would be affected by a FJG along the lines imagined 
here—that is, they would either disappear or be upgraded. 
The much harder question concerns the numerator: what portion of those 
approximately 70 million lower-paid jobs would disappear? Some of those jobs, 
especially those closest to the new floor, would surely be upgraded to the FJG 
threshold; but some would disappear and their occupants would flow into the 
FJG program. This numerator question taps into the enduring controversy within 
labor economics over the impact of minimum wage increases on job creation and 
destruction.150 Economic orthodoxy has it that minimum wage hikes inexorably 
destroy jobs, to the detriment of less productive workers; empirical research 
shows that it ain’t necessarily so, at least as to moderate increases or gradual.151 
 
 149.  BUREAU LAB. STAT., May 2017 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: 
United States (May 2017), https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm#51-0000 [https://perma.cc/45PP-
3EBW].   
 150.  I briefly review the debate in Estlund, What Should We Do?, supra note 1, at 295–97. See 
generally Thomas C. Leonard, The Very Idea of Applying Economics: The Modern Minimum-Wage 
Controversy and Its Antecedents, 32 HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECON. 117 (2000). See, for example, the 
academic kerfluffle surrounding a large-scale empirical study of Seattle’s minimum wage hike in 2016. 
The effects of a single wage increase targeting only some employers in one city proved so complex that 
the authors of the study, who initially concluded that the minimum wage increase on balance hurt low-
wage workers, publicly reversed course two years later after further analysis. See Noam Scheiber, They 
Said Seattle’s Higher Base Pay Would Hurt Workers. Why Did They Flip?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/business/economy/seattle-minimum-wage-study.html 
[https://perma.cc/R3BK-XHQL]. 
 151.  Estlund, What Should We Do?, supra note 1, at 295–96. 
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There is no simple way to cut through that debate or split it down the middle. For 
one thing, the large increases contemplated here fall outside our historical 
experience and outside the range of existing empirical studies. 
Suffice it to say that even labor-friendly economists who support minimum 
wage increases generally agree that large increases, like a national $15 minimum 
wage, are likely to produce significant job losses.152 And the LEI’s version of the 
FJG amounts to a very large minimum wage increase indeed (though one that 
would occur in stages).153 To the extent that a FJG triggered the loss of existing 
private and public sector jobs—those that employers deemed not worth 
upgrading to the FJG threshold, perhaps in view of emerging technological 
substitutes—it would swell the job deficit that the FJG would have to fill, and the 
size of the program. 
That brings us back to the exceedingly difficult numerator question: How to 
estimate how many “affected” jobs would disappear? The LEI report assumes 
that, among very low-wage jobs (those paying the federal minimum wage or less), 
75 percent would be upgraded to the FJG threshold and 25 percent would not, 
such that their occupants would flow into the FJG program. If we applied that 
same assumption to the much larger below-median-wage group of workers that 
would be affected (instead of the LEI’s own assumption that no jobs in that group 
would disappear), that would produce another 17.5 million participants in the 
FJG program from among the currently employed, in addition to the 12.6 to 17.4 
million entering from the ranks of the unemployed, underemployed, or 
discouraged workers. If instead just ten percent of those “affected” workers 
flowed into the program, that would yield 7 million more FJG participants. 
Regarding the per-participant cost of the program: As noted above, the LEI 
calculates that mandatory benefits—fully-funded health insurance, child care, 
and paid leave—would add 20 percent of the wage rate, or $3 per hour, for a total 
cost of $18 per hour. That figure is hard to reconcile with the average cost of 
employer-provided health insurance in 2018 ($5.73 per hour), and the average 
cost of all employee benefits (over $18 per hour).154 It seems a fair guess that the 
actual cost of FJG benefits would be a lot more than $3 per hour, and probably 
 
 152.  See Jared Bernstein, Minimum Wages and Capital/Labor Substitution, ON THE ECON.: JARED 
BERNSTEIN BLOG (Aug. 17, 2015, 3:43 PM), https://jaredbernsteinblog.com/minimum-wages-and-
capitallabor-substitution; Alan B. Krueger, Opinion, The Minimum Wage: How Much Is Too Much?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/opinion/sunday/the-minimum-wage-
how-much-is-too-much.html [https://perma.cc/5VJQ-XZCC]. 
 153.  See LEI, supra note 76, at 4–5. 
 154.  See Bureau of Labor Statistics, EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION–
SEPTEMBER 2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA93-NS7N]. Those 
average benefits include some items, e.g., retirement benefits, that are not included in the LEI proposal; 
but the latter includes some benefits—like fully-funded child care and fully-employer-funded health 
insurance—that most employers do not. The LEI estimate also assumes no employer costs associated 
with job security, though employers clearly act as though job security is costly. See Edward B. Rock & 
Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1914 (1996). 
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somewhere between $5.73 and $18 per hour.155 That would push up both the 
expected cost of the FJG per worker and the expected number of participants 
and of private sector (and public sector but non-FJG) job losses. I have used what 
I think is a conservative number of $20 per hour for wages and benefits, and left 
the estimate of participants as it is above. That would produce total annual wage 
and benefit costs of $41,600 per year per full-time participant, for a total annual 
cost of up to $1.25 to $1.46 trillion. 
 
 
 155.  GULKER, supra note 77, critiques the benefit cost estimates in the LEI proposal as “not 
defensible.” Id. at 8. 
